Young people are mobilising more than ever before for democracy. Hopes are high that the young can act as a democratic catalyst to turn back the powerful wave of authoritarianism across the world. But is this really possible? This report examines what is driving young people to mobilise, how powerful their engagement is, and what kinds of political participation they are developing. Much is written about youth participation; this report gives the word to young people from around the world to let them speak on these issues. They correct some of the conventional wisdom about youth political participation and reveal the complex dynamics of young people’s role in and for democracy today.

The issue has become vitally important. The year 2025 witnessed a surge in youth-led protests, mainly associated with Generation Z, and many revolts have continued into 2026. The large-scale mobilisation of young people has reignited debates on political representation, participation, resilience, and democratic renewal. Common patterns emerge across countries that have witnessed youth-led mobilisations over the past year, despite the diversity of the contexts. Limited economic opportunities, persistent inequalities, restrictions on civic freedoms and expression, and entrenched political elitism all contribute to mounting frustration among young people.

Despite much comment and analysis, the critical question remains insufficiently explored: are current political systems, institutions, and governance models open and responsive to youth participation?

There might be no single answer as to whether increased youth political participation directly strengthens and sustains democracies. But one principle stands firm: inclusive democracy depends on broad societal engagement, including from the largest age cohort globally – young people.^[i] Yet political representation of the younger generation remains disproportionately low, and not just because of increasing disillusionment with politics among young people. Despite the youth’s demographic strength, political systems are often closed, exclusionary, and at times openly resistant to meaningful youth participation.

Entering political spaces can be extremely challenging for young people, who face a range of structural and cultural barriers. These include the high costs, both monetary and non-monetary, of running for office; age-related eligibility restrictions; closed or unfair electoral processes; gender inequality; and sociopolitical environments that are often unsupportive of or discouraging to youth leadership.^[ii] These intersecting obstacles significantly reduce young people’s motivation and the appeal of formal political engagement.[iii]

This report dissects the different ways in which young civic and political actors are responding to these challenges. It offers an unprecedented range of case studies from all world regions, undertaken by young experts close to these debates. The report challenges the view of young people as a homogeneous group of disillusioned and disengaged citizens. It points instead to a variety of forms of youth-led political participation and explores the implications of these strategies for democratic change. Young people emerge as a democratic catalyst, but not necessarily in the ways often assumed to be the case.

The power of data: the Global Youth Participation Index

This report flows from a new index designed to highlight trends in youth participation. Recognising the essential value of research and data for driving change for youth participation, the European Partnership for Democracy (EPD) launched the first-ever Global Youth Participation Index (GYPI) in 2025. The GYPI tracks and compares data on youth participation from 141 countries across four dimensions: political affairs, the socioeconomic context, elections, and civic space. According to the index, low scores, particularly on the political affairs dimension, are not limited to regions where democracy is new or fragile but are a global phenomenon.^[iv]

The GYPI does not show uniform disengagement, which is often assumed to be the main feature of young people’s attitudes to politics. Rather, the trends are nuanced and varied across contexts. In many places, apparent disengagement from traditional forms of politics has been challenged by other forms of participation whose democratic potential has been ignored or undermined.

Across these alternative forms, many turn to informal spaces, particularly social media and other digital platforms, to express their views, organise, and mobilise. Online engagement has significantly expanded the opportunities for youth participation, but it also poses considerable risks and threats. Digital spaces are not safe from the rapid spread of radical, extremist, and populist narratives, many of which deliberately target young people’s vulnerabilities.

All of this is happening in the context of rapidly shrinking and even closing civic space. Another important finding of the GYPI is that civic space tends to be more open to youth participation than do political affairs or elections. Research also shows that young people have been experiencing a move from apathy to antipathy, as the young seem to be increasingly embracing illiberal preferences and hostility towards democratic institutions whose structures and performance are no longer deemed adequate to respond to young citizens’ needs.[v]

Lessons and insights

To complement the GYPI with qualitative research, the EPD commissioned case studies from members of our Young Researchers’ Network. Their 12 chapters provide a rich breadth and depth of information and examples that shed new light on youth participation.^[vi]

The following studies weave together research and policy findings on youth engagement. They lay out recommendations to promote and sustain a meaningful and transformative approach to youth participation in both formal and informal decision-making. The case studies offer diverse, thought-provoking, and timely reflections on the challenges and opportunities of youth engagement in different contexts. From the studies, five key messages and insights emerge.

First, all contributions point to the need to move beyond the simple question of whether young people engage, and instead to focus on how youth engagement takes place and why it assumes particular forms. This shift in perspective allows for a more nuanced understanding of the drivers, modalities, and motivations that underlie youth participation.

Second, the contributions suggest a mixed picture with regard to the claim that young people prefer informal forms of engagement over mainstream political participation. While some authors do highlight this tendency, others reveal an increasing willingness among young people to challenge thestatus quo by seeking to transform political channels and institutional structures from within.

Third, several of the challenges identified in the contributions operate at the macro level, whereas others are rooted in the micro-context of specific national settings. This duality underscores the importance of engaging simultaneously with broad, structural trends and specific local realities.

Fourth, the case studies demonstrate that the role of a specific regime – or the broader political context under analysis – is more significant in explaining variations in outcomes than are the differences between young people and other segments of the population. In other words, contextual political factors often outweigh generational divides in shaping patterns of engagement.

Last but not least, an in-depth reading of the contributions highlights a paradox. On the one hand, survey data indicates that a growing number of young people are drawn towards illiberal values, parties, and/or regimes. On the other hand, illiberal regimes often impose such restrictions on youth engagement that they push young people towards more radical positions in defence of fundamental liberal rights. These two dynamics coexist and interact, dispelling an overly simplistic narrative that portrays young people as moving inexorably and uniformly closer to authoritarianism.

Case studies

The report presents the following 12 case studies, which explore the diverse layers and angles of youth participation.

Dércio Tsandzana analyses Mozambique’s #PovoNoPoder movement and its online engagement to challenge the narrative of the country’s young people as passive, instead portraying them as closely involved outside the traditional political system. However, Tsandzana also highlights the contradictions and non-linear evolution of this youth engagement, bringing to the fore the valuable contributions of young Mozambicans through digital activism.

Mehmet İlhanlı discusses how the securitisation of young people in Türkiye, which intensified after the 2013 Gezi Park protests, has constrained and reshaped their political engagement. According to İlhanlı, young people are the demographic most affected by the country’s democratic decline, as they are being excluded, stigmatised, and securitised. Despite young people’s efforts to seek alternative spaces for political expression and activism, their continued stigmatisation by the government will have a profound negative impact on Türkiye’s democratisation.

Obaa Akua Konadu-Osei writes about the cost of politics in Ghana, with a particular focus on the intersection between youth and gender as well as the way in which access to financial resources creates a barrier to parliamentary aspirations. The case study highlights the fundamental challenges young Ghanaians face in fully entering democratic channels, even when they are highly engaged and mobilised in the country’s political landscape. Such obstacles, according to Konadu-Osei, are similar for women and youth, implying a need to rethink political-party funding to give young people fairer access to the political system.

Ajda Hedžet investigates the Free El Hiblu 3 campaign to explore how young migrant men claim their voice from the margins of systems that often silence them. The case highlights the limits of institutional recognition, the criminalisation of young migrants, and the digital struggle for justice. It illustrates how political agency and demands for justice are enacted outside formal institutions. The campaign underscores that Europe’s migration governance is both a site of contestation and a front line for democratic renewal.

Olga Paredes Brítez carries out a comparative analysis of municipal youth policies in Buenos Aires (Argentina) and Asunción (Paraguay). Both municipalities have adopted a vision of young people as “adults in the making” – an adult-centric approach that hinders the recognition and empowerment of young people as full political subjects. The case study provides an additional layer of analysis through the perspective of municipal-level youth engagement and discusses the decentralisation and municipalisation processes in the two countries.

Oripha Chimwara explores the impact of Zimbabwe’s quota system of reserved parliamentary seats for young candidates in creating positive ripple effects for youth engagement in the country. Chimwara also analyses the obstacles to young Zimbabweans’ political participation that remain despite this positive step: administrative hurdles, the cost of politics, and a pervasive patronage system.

Mark Ortiz examines intergenerational politics through the 1970 United Nations (UN) World Youth Assembly, highlighting the complexities of youth representation and the lessons for multilateral engagement today. Ortiz compares this gathering with the UN’s 2024 Summit of the Future, where meaningful youth participation was central in reflecting commitments in the UN’s Youth2030 strategy. The two cases illustrate the enduring impact of youth leadership on the ethos and practice of multilateralism.

Ellie Catherall analyses how and to what extent young people’s voices were represented and included in the drafting of Chile’s 2023 proposed constitution. The analysis shows that despite young people’s view that a new constitution should be representative of Chilean society, the dominance of right-wing parties in the drafting process meant the status quo was maintained. Besides this exclusion of youth voices, young Chileans also felt increasingly detached from the process because of a lack of reliable and impartial information.

Wasal Naser Faqiryar describes how young people in Afghanistan are finding alternative channels to express their grievances, ideas, and dreams to counter the oppressive grip of the Taliban regime. Faqiryar identifies art and other creative forms of expression as fundamental avenues that remain possible, as they pass under the radar of the regime’s control. The chapter also discusses social media as an important platform for the amplification and diffusion of the concerns, needs, and desires of young Afghans.

Ambar Kumar Ghosh presents the importance of youth representation in the democratic life of India, a country with a large young population. The analysis looks at the most significant challenges for young Indians in engaging in parliamentary politics: the cost of politics, the role of established parties in nominating young candidates, disillusionment about political careers, the pervasiveness of dynastic politics, and gender disparities. Ghosh argues that granting young people access to legislative politics would have a positive impact on India’s governance structures.

Dechen Rabgyal explains the minimal engagement of Bhutan’s young people in traditional politics through the lens of democratic elitism. Rabgyal shows how despite civil and democratic programmes equipping young Bhutanese to run for office, a requirement for parliamentary candidates to have at least 10 years’ professional experience reproduces inequalities and excludes a significant portion of Bhutan’s young people from the country’s legislature. The case study highlights the importance of adopting a more realistic approach to ensuring youth engagement.

Finally, Intifar Chowdhury writes about the evolving political relevance of mainstream parties in Australia, analysing how younger generations, disillusioned with traditional parties, are moving away from them. Chowdhury highlights a disconnect between the political priorities of younger voters and traditional political parties, which creates a risk of dealignment. In addition, the chapterexamines how young Australians are more closely linked to issue-based politics, on topics such as climate change, education, and housing, than to traditional party-political divisions.

These case studies aim to spark important discussions of the multiple layers and dimensions of youth political participation. Beyond highlighting diverse experiences and approaches, they provide insights that can inform research and advocacy for more meaningful youth involvement. We encourage readers to engage with these studies, which can support efforts to strengthen young people’s agency and influence. In an age when so much hinges on youth participation, this report gives a voice to a unique range of young writers from around the world to shape these debates.

Ana Mosiashvili is a research and programmes manager at the European Partnership for Democracy (EPD).

Sara Canali is a doctoral researcher at Ghent University and UNU-CRIS.

Explore the Full Study

The Young Researchers’ Network is an initiative developed in the framework of the European Democracy Hub and EPD’s Women and Youth in Democracy WYDE Civic Engagement project, supported by the European Union.

Get to know the 12 Young Researchers

^[i] “United Nations Sustainable Development Goals”, United Nations, https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/youth/.

^[ii] “Cost of Politics”, Westminster Foundation for Democracy, https://costofpolitics.net/.

[iii] Gerardo Berthin, “Why Are Youth Dissatisfied with Democracy?”, Freedom House, 14 September 2023, https://freedomhouse.org/article/why-are-youth-dissatisfied-democracy.

^[iv] Brit Anlar et al., “The Global Youth Participation Index: Report 2025”, European Partnership for Democracy, 2025, https://gypi.studiopompelmoes.eu/assets/images/GYPI-Final-Report.pdf.

[v] Roberto Foa and Yascha Mounk, The Danger of Deconsolidation: The Democratic Disconnect (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Kennedy School, 2019).

^[vi] “The Young Researchers’ Network”, Youth Democracy Cohort, https://youthdemocracycohort.com/the-young-researchers-network/.

The post How Young People Are Redefining Political Participation first appeared on Youth Democracy Cohort.

A Comparative Study of Political Generations in Australia

In most advanced democracies, declining electoral turnout is disproportionately concentrated among young people.^[i] For example, in the 2024 United Kingdom general election, less than half of 18- to 24-year-olds cast a ballot, compared with three-quarters of people aged 65 or above.^[ii] Similar trends were seen in recent elections in France and Germany, where young people were considerably less likely to vote than older people.^[iii]

Low electoral engagement underscores democratic inequality: those who are economically and socially disadvantaged abstain from taking part.^[iv] This then introduces a representation bias in public policy, reduces government responsiveness, and compromises political competition.^[v]

With its strictly enforced compulsory voting, Australia has not suffered a similar fall in youth turnout in federal and state elections. Compulsory voting ties young people to the political system, even when they are disillusioned by mainstream party politics. This is almost an enforced exposure to the political system, which prevents apathy and disenfranchisement and stops young people from turning away from democratic politics. Does this mean that youth democratic engagement in Australia manifests itself differently from elsewhere?

The reasons for examining the Australian experience are twofold. First, despite compulsory voting, there has been a gradual and continued decline in Australians’ trust in politics since 2007.^[vi] Satisfaction with democracy has fallen rapidly, in 2019 reaching its lowest level since the 1970s.^[vii] Second, both major political parties have seen a steady decline in their support over the past two decades; they won less than 70% of the primary vote between them in the 2022 and 2025 federal elections.^[viii] This remarkable drop-off is attributed to poor performances by successive governments and a broad detachment from politics across generations. Voters’ poor evaluations of the country’s governance are also reflected in a rise in support for minor parties and independent candidates.

Once among the most satisfied democratic nations in the world, Australia scored a modest 79 out of 100 in the European Partnership for Democracy’s 2025 Global Youth Participation Index, owing to a lack of youth disengagement and youth-focused policies and candidates.^[ix] Australia’s score of 64 out of 100 on the index’s political affairs dimension reflects young people’s moderate representation in parliament and party structures, an absence of youth quotas, and young people’s limited influence in leadership roles. Disillusionment with formal institutions is rising among young Australians, especially as public spending is skewed towards older demographics, despite economic pressures on younger workers.

This study investigates how and why young Australians are reshaping the political landscape. Looking at intergenerational differences in democratic engagement, the research draws implications for future political-party competition in Australia. The chapter shows that young people are increasingly willing to explore alternatives to the major parties. This signals that future parliaments will increasingly instil a balance of power in non-established minor parties and independents. But as the Australian electorate evolves to become more aligned by issue than by party, no political actor can take the youth vote for granted. Australian politicians will have to adapt to the changing policy priorities of younger generations to gain and retain support from election to election.

Dr. Intifar Chowdhury is a political scientist and youth researcher whose work focuses on strengthening democratic participation and representation among young people, combining academic research with public engagement and policy-relevant commentary.

Get to know Intifzar

Background and approach

To avoid the misunderstanding that young people are disengaging from the democratic system in Australia, it must be stressed at the outset that there is no evidence of a decline in youth commitment to democracy as a desired system of government.

This chapter focuses on generational replacement or change as the key explanation of youth engagement. People socialise politically in their formative years, when they develop certain patterns of behaviour based on their experiences in late adolescence and early adulthood. These attitudes persist throughout their lives and are resistant to change from new developments.^[x] Generational replacement occurs when younger generations, who are socialised in different historical periods, replace older cohorts.

Generational cohorts differ because of slow evolutionary change. The underlying mechanism is the accumulation of certain characteristics due to societal transformations, such as a rise in education or the development of new technologies. These transformations are different from disruptive events like wars or pandemics. The events of specific time periods can also impact democratic attitudes and behaviours, but these effects influence the entire population rather than just people in their formative years. Therefore, there is a distinction between lasting characteristics and sudden changes in political behaviour that are particular to a given cohort.

The gradual decline in political engagement across generations provides support for societal modernisation, which is a long, continuous process of transformations, rather than a one-off feature. The withdrawal from traditional practices is due to lasting generational characteristics and is not unique to one cohort, meaning it does not subsequently fade away.

This chapter highlights how Australia’s younger generations, despite being equally committed to democracy, interact with traditional political institutions, such as political parties and elites, differently from older generations. The study covers the six generations since 1915 (table 12.1).

Table 12.1. The six generations included in this study

The generational change in Australia’s electoral politics away from traditional party loyalties can be referred to as voter de-alignment. This concept describes a drift away from political parties altogether, as opposed to voter realignment, where voters shift their loyalties from one party to another.^[xi]

Features of realignment include new voting coalitions and parties winning over groups that were not previously theirs. By contrast, de-alignment is characterised by a rising number of independent candidates, declining partisan identification, and more volatile voting, where issues matter more than party loyalties in determining voters’ choices from one election to the next. When partisan weakening happens for a sustained period across generations, it reflects a lasting generational shift rather than a temporary youth rebellion that tends to moderate with age.

This chapter uses nationally representative post-election survey data from the Australian Election Study (AES), collected between 1987 and 2022, to look at political orientations, government evaluations, and voting patterns across generations.^[xii] It uses descriptive and inferential statistics to reveal generational and voter groups that are turning away from major parties. A limitation of this cohort approach is that the effects of factors such as age and time period are not isolated from generational effects. But a 2021 study attempted to separate these effects in Australia and concluded that fixed generational effects are the most important in explaining youth (dis)engagement.^[xiii]

How young people are changing politics

In terms of their political orientation, young Australians tend to be less interested in politics, more progressive or left-wing in their political views, and less knowledgeable about political facts than their predecessors (figure 12.1, top row). Meanwhile, when it comes to evaluations of governments, young people are less likely to be satisfied with democracy and less likely to trust the government than older generations (figure 12.1, bottom row).^[xiv] All generations are comparable in the differences they see between the two major political parties, the centre-left Labor Party and the centre-right Liberal Party.

Figure 12.1. Generational trends in political orientation and government evaluation

Poor evaluations of governance are also reflected in the rise in support for minor political parties and independent candidates.^[xv] In 1980, non-major groups accounted for only 8% of the vote. By 2025, this had increased to 34%, the highest share ever recorded when a major party received fewer votes than independents and minor parties.^[xvi] This trend is mirrored in Australia’s states and territories, where all jurisdictions have experienced some form of power sharing.

Although young voters remain engaged at the polls, thanks in part to compulsory voting, they are also abandoning party loyalties. Younger generations are less likely to align with a major party, less likely to consistently vote for the same party, and more likely to change their voting intention during election campaigns (figure 12.2).^[xvii]

Figure 12.2. Partisan stability and vote switching by generation

The decrease in the major parties’ primary vote share, the rise of minor parties, the erosion of previously strong predictors of electoral choice, the increase in issue-based voting, and the increase in swing and undecided voters all point to a fragmented but more responsive electorate. The decline in the number of people who identify with a political party provides stark evidence of voter volatility and partisan de-alignment.

Alongside these trends, the political context of each election is crucial. Over the period of the AES, voting decisions have increasingly been driven by policy issues, with 48% of all Australians surveyed from 1996 to 2022 citing these as the primary factor (figure 12.3). This is followed by party affiliation (29%), party leaders (14%), and local candidates (9%). In 2022, 54% of voters reported policy issues as the main factor that influenced their vote choice. Across the generations, Gen Z is more issue aligned than party aligned.

Figure 12.3. Most important factors in voting decisions by generation

These findings support the societal modernisation theory and the cognitive mobilisation thesis that a changing social context is characterised by long-term societal transformations that encourage young people to withdraw from traditional democratic processes.^[xviii] As a result, there is conclusive evidence that the modern-day democrat is assertive, demanding, and punitive. Today’s young people are fluid citizens who change their party loyalties and act based on political issues that directly impact their lives.

Why young people are changing politics

The reason young people’s politics have changed is that young Australians today face a vastly different set of challenges from their parents and grandparents. While they may earn more in nominal terms than previous generations, today’s young people are burdened by rising living costs, escalating education expenses, insecure employment, and growing debt.^[xix] Structural shifts in the economy and the labour market have reshaped young adulthood, delaying key milestones like homeownership, long-term partnerships, and parenthood.

University participation has increased, but so too has student debt – well beyond what was envisaged when Australia introduced the Higher Education Contribution Scheme in 1989 as a fair, income-contingent loan system.^[xx] Indexation has historically outpaced wage growth, leaving today’s 20-somethings with debts over A$10,000 (US$7,000) – higher in real terms than their counterparts two decades ago. Credential inflation has transformed the job market, with even low-wage roles now requiring a university degree.^[xxi] Many graduates find themselves in jobs unrelated to their qualifications, with job mismatch rates among 25-year-olds rising from 28.5% in 1996 to 33% by 2019.^[xxii]

Housing affordability has also deteriorated. In 2000, the average house in Australia cost around nine times the average household income; by 2024, that figure had risen to 16.4 times.^[xxiii] Since 2001, property prices have outpaced incomes by a factor of 2.3.^[xxiv] This was driven in part by tax incentives like the capital gains tax discount introduced in 1999 by the government of Prime Minister John Howard and, more recently, by demand in the era of the Covid-19 pandemic.^[xxv] While schemes like the First Home Owner Grant offer some support, saving for a deposit remains a years-long challenge for most.

For many in Australia, intergenerational wealth is now the key to homeownership. Since 2002, the total value of wealth transfers has more than doubled in real terms, with inheritances expected to quadruple by 2050.^[xxvi] Yet because parental wealth is unevenly distributed, inheritance is set to deepen inequality within the youth cohort.

In short, young Australians are staying younger for longer. The traditional path to adulthood – stable work, savings, and homeownership – has been disrupted and delayed. It is no surprise, then, that many young people feel let down by government policy. According to the 2024 Australian Youth Barometer, 62% believe they will be worse off than their parents.^[xxvii] As for different generations’ perceptions of the national economy (figure 12.4, top row) and of household finances (figure 12.4, bottom row), Gen Z seem to be most unimpressed by the impact of government policies.

Figure 12.4. Perceptions of the national economy and of household finances by generation

Implications for party politics

Australia’s demographic shift has enabled the Greens to capitalise on generational replacement as younger voters gradually displace older generations at the polls. Young people’s de-alignment away from the major parties represents a critical disadvantage to the centre right.^[xxviii] Meanwhile, Labor has positioned itself as the preferred party in Australia’s two-party system when it comes to addressing these critical issues, alongside the rising cost of living.

Across the generations, the Coalition partners – the Liberal Party and the centre-right National Party – have become increasingly unfavourable as younger generations tend to feel more positively towards left-of-centre parties (figure 12.5). With centre-left issues gaining traction, the Coalition is likely to see a further erosion of its support among younger voters.^[xxix]

Figure 12.5. Generational trends in feelings towards political parties

Conclusion

Australia’s younger generations are reshaping the country’s politics not only through their values but also through their lived experiences. Members of Gen Z, like their millennial predecessors, are navigating a delayed and disrupted transition to adulthood, marked by insecure work, rising debt, unaffordable housing, and climate change anxiety.^[xxx] These conditions have fuelled disillusionment with the major parties and driven a shift towards issue-based, swing voting. In a political landscape where stability feels out of reach, young Australians are demanding something different, and their politics are starting to reflect it.

The root cause of youth disengagement from major parties may be the fact that generational change was not accompanied by political reform, widening the gap between the elites and the underrepresented. Unlike previous generations, today’s young people hold more postmaterialist and progressive values and are less likely to align with political parties. Instead, they choose to act based on specific issues, like climate change, education equity, and housing affordability – issues often sidelined by mainstream parties.

This benefits minor parties, but in a two-party system like Australia’s, young voters’ shift away from major parties has significant implications. It must be acknowledged that disengagement in any form is not good news for democracy. Young citizens may choose to disengage and remain apathetic, perhaps because of a reduced belief in the efficacy of the government system. However, disillusionment leads to misrepresentation, and this is harmful both for young constituents and for the overall health of the democratic system.

This disconnect highlights a deeper problem: traditional institutions, such as political parties, are failing to adapt to the priorities of younger generations. The entry of a younger, more diverse electorate will influence political priorities. If parties fail to respond to voters’ concerns, there is a growing risk of political disengagement or backlash, particularly through support for minor parties and independents. There were already signs of this in the 2022 federal election, and again in the 2025 election, when the primary vote in the lower house was divided almost evenly three ways between Labor, the Coalition, and minor parties and independents.^[xxxi]

To stay in the game, major parties need major resets. Party systems are highly adaptive and have done this before. An influential 1967 perspective that described the evolution of democratic party systems focused on cleavages: the deep social, economic, and cultural divisions that structure political competition and shape the emergence of key party units.^[xxxii] For example, labour parties emerged to represent working-class interests. With younger generations quite distinct from older ones in their economic and social experiences and prospects, a new generational cleavage has emerged. Younger and older voters have different policy priorities, which shape new political divisions and party strategies. What is more, these priorities change from election to election.

In the immediate future, Australia may well see more minority governments and a fragmentation of the two-party system. A big challenge for the country’s major parties is to take the pulse of the nation, which now comprises a more volatile voter base, to build and then rebuild coalitions of electoral support at each contest.

Explore the Full Study

This chapter is part of a Deep Dive of Young Researchers who worked on Youth Participation for three years. This deep dive is a global collection of 12 case studies unpacking how young people are reshaping political engagement.

The Young Researchers’ Network is an initiative developed in the framework of the European Democracy Hub and EPD’s Women and Youth in Democracy WYDE Civic Engagement project, supported by the European Union.

Get to know the 12 Young Researchers

[i] Filip Kostelka and André Blais, “The Generational and Institutional Sources of the Global Decline in Voter Turnout”, World Politics 73, no. 4 (2021): 629–67; Gerardo Berthin, “Why Are Youth Dissatisfied with Democracy?”, Perspectives, Freedom House, 14 September 2023.

[ii] Jamie Morris, “‘It’s a vicious cycle why many young people don’t vote’”, BBC News, 28 June 2024.

[iii] Bastian Herre, “Young People Are Less Likely to Vote than Older People — Often Considerably So”, Our World in Data, 3 July 2024.

[iv] Ruth Dassonneville and Marc Hooghe, “Voter Turnout Decline and Stratification: Quasi-Experimental and Comparative Evidence of a Growing Educational Gap”, Politics 37, no. 2 (2017): 184–200.

[v] André Blais et al., “Where Does Turnout Decline Come From?”, European Journal of Political Research 43, no. 2 (2004): 221–36.

[vi] Ruth Dassonneville and Ian McAllister, “Explaining the Decline of Political Trust in Australia”, Australian Journal of Political Science 56, no. 3 (2021): 280–97.

[vii] Sarah Cameron, “Government Performance and Dissatisfaction with Democracy in Australia”, Australian Journal of Political Science 55, no. 2 (2020): 170–90.

[viii] Bill Browne and Minh Ngoc Le, “The Steady Decline of Voters Choosing the Major Parties Is Reshaping Australian Politics”, Australia Institute, 24 October 2024; Skye Predavec, “The 2025 Federal Election Is the First Where a Major Party Received Fewer Votes than Independents and Minor Parties”, Australia Institute, 4 June 2025.

[ix] “Explore Youth Participation in Australia”, Global Youth Participation Index, European Partnership for Democracy, 2025.

[x] Mark N. Franklin, Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established Democracies Since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

[xi] Paul Webb and Tim Bale, “Understanding Electoral Change: Realignment or Dealignment?”, in The Modern British Party System, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021).

[xii] Ian McAllister et al., “Australian Election Study Integrated Time Series Data”, ADA Dataverse, V3, 2024, https://doi.org/10.26193/HJ3KT1.

[xiii] Intifar S. Chowdhury, “Are Young Australians Turning Away from Democracy?”, Australian Journal of Political Science 56, no. 2 (2021): 171–88.

[xiv] Cameron, “Government Performance”; Dassonneville and McAllister, “Explaining”.

[xv] Cameron, “Government Performance”; Browne and Le, “The Steady Decline”.

[xvi] Predavec, “The 2025 Federal Election”.

[xvii] Intifar S. Chowdhury, “Every Generation Thinks They Had It the Toughest, but for Gen Z, They’re Probably Right”, The Conversation, 21 March 2025.

[xviii] Russell J. Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan, and Paul A. Beck, Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Russell J. Dalton, The Apartisan American: Dealignment and Changing Electoral Politics (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2013).

[xix] Chowdhury, “Every Generation”.

[xx] Greg Jericho and Jack Thrower, “People are starting with much larger HECS/HELP debts than in the past – and it is only going to get worse”, Off the Charts, Australia Institute, 23 April 2024.

[xxi] Tom Karmel, “The Return to Education – An Occupational Perspective”, Mackenzie Research Institute, November 2023.

[xxii] Derby Voon and Paul W. Miller, “Undereducation and Overeducation in the Australian Labour Market”, Economic Record 81 (2005): S22–S33; Intifar S. Chowdhury, Ben Edwards, and Andrew Norton, “Youth Education Decisions and Occupational Misalignment and Mismatch: Evidence from a Representative Cohort Study of Australian Youth”, Oxford Review of Education 50, no. 5 (2024): 727–47.

[xxiii] Greg Jericho, “The ‘Good Old Days’ for Housing Affordability Were Just Four Years Ago – Here’s Why”, Grogonomics, Guardian, 14 March 2024.

[xxiv] Greg Jericho, “It’s Time We Asked: What Is the Cost Not Just to the Budget, but to Society, When the Richest Are Helped to Get Richer?”, Grogonomics, Guardian, 27 February 2025.

[xxv] Gavin Wood, “Sustaining Home Ownership in the 21st Century: Emerging Policy Concerns”, Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute, 26 April 2012.

[xxvi] “Wealth Transfers and Their Economic Effects”, Australian Government Productivity Commission, November 2021.

[xxvii] Lucas Walsh et al., “The 2024 Australian Youth Barometer”, Centre for Youth Policy and Education Practice, Monash University, 2024.

[xxviii] Ian McAllister, “Party Explanations for the 2022 Australian Election Result”, Australian Journal of Political Science 58, no. 4 (2023): 309–25.

[xxix] Predavec, “The 2025 Federal Election”; Intifar S. Chowdhury, “This Election, Young People Held the Most Political Power. Here’s How They Voted”, The Conversation, 16 May 2025.

[xxx] Chowdhury, “Every Generation”; Jericho, “It’s Time”; Jericho and Thrower, “People are starting”.

[xxxi] Predavec, “The 2025 Federal Election”; Frank Bongiorno, “Splits, Fusions and Evolutions: How Australia’s Political Parties Took Hold”, The Conversation, 13 February 2025.

[xxxii] Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (editors), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives (New York: The Free Press, 1967).

The post Chapter 12 by Intifar Chowdhury first appeared on Youth Democracy Cohort.

Enhancing Youth Representation in Zimbabwe Through Effective Quotas

Across the globe, quotas have been used to promote the inclusion of underrepresented social groups. Indeed, the introduction of such provisions in politics is widely regarded as a legitimate way of ensuring equal opportunities.^[i]Previously, representational politics centred on gender quotas; recently, the focus has shifted to youth quotas.

Reports by the Inter-Parliamentary Union highlight that about half of the global population is aged under 30, yet young people are underrepresented in national parliaments: in 2023, only 2.8% of the world’s parliamentarians were under 30, while 18.8% were under 40.^[ii] This lack of youth representation diminishes institutional credibility, intensifies young people’s feelings of powerlessness, and prevents parliaments from effectively addressing the critical issues that affect this social group.^[iii]

But while youth quotas appear to be desirable political tools, there is no consensus on their impact on representation. Beyond their potential benefits, the novelty of quotas and the broader political and institutional framework in which they are implemented also play fundamental roles in shaping youth inclusion.^[iv] Thus, youth quotas, although progressive, are “merely one aspect of the more important project of ‘democratising democracy’”.^[v]

Zimbabwe introduced a youth quota system in 2021. This chapter examines the conditions under which quotas contribute to the equal and fair representation of young people in the country’s parliament. Specifically, the study explores to what extent Zimbabwe’s quota system is accompanied by an ecosystem of institutions, laws, and programmes that promote youth participation in the legislature. The findings will help inform policy in countries such as Zimbabwe that are new to the use of youth quotas.

Dr Oripha Chimwara is a political scientist and author whose work focuses on natural resource governance, women, and youth participation, advocating for inclusive decision-making and democratic accountability.

Get to know Oripha

Methodology

This study employed a qualitative methodology to examine the influence of Zimbabwe’s youth quota on promoting youth inclusion in parliament. The research was carried out as part of the author’s PhD study on youth participation and representation in Zimbabwe. Interviews were conducted with parliamentary officials, four young parliamentarians, and six youth activists.

The parliamentarians and activists were selected according to strict criteria. The former were members of the Zimbabwean parliament that was formed after the 2023 general elections; they were all aged between 18 and 35 at the time of their election. The latter were members of the same age group who were working either independently or under a registered civil society organisation. The criteria of sex, education level, and party affiliation were not used either to include or to exclude participants.

The study also drew on primary and secondary source documents to place the findings in a broader national and international context. Documents consulted included journal articles, election observation reports, civil society organisation reports, and media reporting, such as press releases and newspaper articles.

This approach, based on multiple qualitative methods, ensured corroboration of the findings. Research participants were assured of anonymity through the removal of all identifiers and the use of codification.

Introduction of a youth quota in Zimbabwe

The paradox of elections is that they can be used to promote or undermine democratic governance.^[vi] Having now held several elections since gaining independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has a political landscape marked by feelings of apathy, despair, and resignation among a significant number of young people.^[vii]

The issue of youth representation in Zimbabwe’s national parliament is a relatively recent phenomenon, although a women’s quota has existed since 2013. Calls for greater youth inclusion in parliament have come from both local and international organisations. In 2019, the Youth Empowerment and Transformation Trust (YETT) called for 50% youth quotas for political parties, parliament, and government to ensure young people’s effective representation and participation in democratic processes.^[viii] A 2018 report by the Zimbabwe Election Support Network highlighted the need to involve young candidates in decision-making.^[ix]

Similar views were expressed during a 2018 conference led by the Mandela Institute for Development Studies titled “Reigniting Hope for Democracy beyond Elections in Zimbabwe”. Participants argued that because young people constitute a majority of citizens in Zimbabwe, this should be reflected in the make-up of leadership positions, including in parliament. International election observers, such as the Commonwealth, also urged Zimbabwe to consider a youth quota system similar to those of other countries, like Rwanda.

In response to these calls, a constitutional amendment in 2021 introduced a youth quota system in Zimbabwe for the first time. The system reserves 10 out of 280 seats in the National Assembly – the lower house of the national parliament – for members aged between 21 and 35, one from each of the country’s 10 provinces. They are elected by party-list proportional representation.^[x] This system was first used in the 2023 general elections.

Zimbabwe’s youth quota of just under 4% is comparable with that of the four other countries that have a similar system: Uganda (1.2%), Rwanda (1.8%), Kenya (3.4%), and Morocco (7.6%).^[xi]

Impact of the youth quota

Zimbabwe’s introduction of a youth quota system has had far-reaching implications for representational politics in the country and for the structure of parliament, in addition to providing a foundation from which to improve Zimbabwean democracy. Indeed, the quota system is the most significant advance in youth representation in Zimbabwe’s current parliament. The Commonwealth’s 2023 election observation mission commended the establishment of the youth quota.^[xii]

Four research participants interviewed for this study expressed their support for the quota, calling it a “positive beginning” for youth representation in parliament. They argued that the quota creates an open political environment for young people to attain leadership roles. These roles are often difficult to reach through traditional party pathways because of prevailing cultural factors, which place the elderly in sacrosanct positions.^[xiii] In the words of one study, young Zimbabweans have to navigate “gerontocratic masculinities”.^[xiv]

Supporting the youth quota, one young parliamentarian from the main opposition party argued that “the youth quota is a progressive measure which should be applauded as it shows that the Zimbabwean government is pushing towards the best international practices on ensuring youth [can] participate in decision-making institutions”.^[xv]

The youth quota has also increased the number of young people who stand as candidates in elections. This confirms earlier research that found that the youth quota has promoted young people’s candidacies.^[xvi] Interviewees highlighted that “for the first time, many youths were not afraid to stand as candidates”. Others argued that the quota’s significance lies in the fact that it serves as an “initiation process” for young people into decision-making.

As a result of the youth quota, Zimbabwe’s 2023 elections saw an increase in the number of young people in parliament for the first time since 1980. A total of 35 young people were elected;^[xvii] in addition to the 10 under the youth quota, this figure includes eight parliamentarians who were elected through a separate quota for women and 17 who were elected directly under no quota. Thus, youth representation in the 2023 parliament stood at 12%, an increase from 2% in the previous legislature.^[xviii]

Comparing Zimbabwe with its neighbours reveals a positive link between the presence of a youth quota and the level of youth representation. In the European Partnership for Democracy’s 2025 Global Youth Participation Index (GYPI), Zimbabwe achieved a score of 13 out of 100 for youth representation in the legislature, significantly higher than Mozambique’s 3 out of 100, Zambia’s 2 out of 100, and Botswana’s 0 out of 100 – all countries that lack youth quotas.^[xix] In contrast, South Africa, which also does not have a quota, scored 14 out of 100.^[xx] These scores illustrate that while a quota can enhance youth representation in the legislature, other factors, including the quality of political rights, are also crucial. On this dimension, South Africa performed well, scoring 86 out of 100, compared with Zimbabwe’s 28 out of 100.^[xxi]

Zimbabwe’s introduction of a youth quota system – combined with the existing quota system for women, which was extended by a constitutional amendment in 2021 – broadened the avenues for young people to be elected. Still, while young women had more options for getting elected than their male counterparts, they remain underrepresented in parliament. Of the 10 seats reserved for young people, only three are occupied by women.^[xxii] Meanwhile, only one of the 17 young parliamentarians who entered the legislature by direct election is a woman. Eight young women from the ruling ZANU-PF party were elected under the women’s quota.

Despite the positive outcome of the youth quota, concerns have been raised about its implementation. The 2019 YETT report questioned the extent to which the dynamics of political engagement in Zimbabwe could be effectively addressed through the country’s party-list system.^[xxiii] There has also been criticism of the limited number of seats reserved for young people. This view was supported by nearly 80% of the study participants.

Indeed, establishing a quota of 10 youth seats highlights the imbalance in parliamentary representation in a country where young people make up the majority of the adult population.^[xxiv] The quota system should therefore be viewed as one element of a broader democratic project aimed at promoting youth representation in parliament. Zimbabwe’s wider institutional and political framework needs to be structured in a way that reflects the ethos of the representation agenda.

Overall, Zimbabwe’s first experience of a youth quota system has been somewhat beneficial, yet its impact on long-term democratic growth is unclear. On the one hand, by ensuring a minimum number of young people in the legislature, the quota has allowed for some youth representation. On the other hand, the quota alone is not what drives young Zimbabweans’ political involvement, as it allocates only 10 reserved seats, whereas 17 young people were directly elected to the current parliament with no quota. This underscores that meaningful youth representation depends on favourable political conditions more broadly.

The quota therefore risks serving as a ceiling rather than a floor: it suggests that as long as the 10 designated seats are occupied, the issue of youth engagement has been sufficiently addressed. Thus, rather than encouraging and promoting young candidates across all constituencies, the quota may in fact limit the growth of youth representation by standardising a fixed, limited number of young parliamentarians.

This dynamic raises concerns about the potential of quotas to deepen democracy in Zimbabwe. By highlighting the youth presence in parliament, the regime can project an image of inclusiveness without tackling fundamental reforms to liberalise the country’s broader political environment.

Challenges to youth representation in Zimbabwe

The issue of youth representation in Zimbabwe’s parliament should not be viewed solely through the lens of quotas. The democratic task of ensuring youth participation should also focus on the broader political and institutional environment in which the quota system is implemented. An analysis of the 2023 elections, when the quota was first used, reveals that several structural, economic, and political factors hindered young people’s participation and their subsequent uptake of leadership positions.

Young Zimbabweans faced various administrative challenges during the elections that affected their ability to register to vote and stand as candidates. For example, some young people had to pay an additional US$2 for travel to registration centres that were not well located.^[xxv]

Another administrative challenge was the exorbitant fees required to register as a parliamentary or presidential candidate. A 2022 law had increased the nomination fee for a constituency election from US$50 to US$1,000.^[xxvi] This 1,900% increase made Zimbabwe the country with the highest nomination fees in the region.^[xxvii] Such fees disadvantaged potential young candidates.^[xxviii]

Election campaigns further increase the cost of politics for young people. A 2001 act provides state funding for parties that received at least 5% of the vote in the previous general elections.^[xxix] In 2023, a total of Z$1.5 billion was disbursed to qualifying political parties, with ZANU-PF receiving just over Z$1 billion and the remaining Z$450 million being given to the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) Alliance.^[xxx]

The significance of state funding for political parties when it comes to youth participation is twofold. First, because only qualifying parties receive this funding, parties are instrumental in financing campaigns. Campaign costs are high for individuals, especially young people who decide to run as independent candidates or come from minor parties that do not get state funding.

Second, resource disparities between ZANU-PF and the MDC Alliance unevenly affect the relative chances of these parties’ candidates. Worse, reports indicate that in the 2023 elections, ZANU-PF used many state resources for its campaign, the costs of which were covered by the party directly.^[xxxi] Meanwhile, the MDC Alliance had limited resources, and the party’s individual candidates bore their own campaign costs.^[xxxii] Party alignment thus influences the cost of politics for young Zimbabweans.

The cost of politics in Zimbabwe is also high because of clientelism. A clientelist party provides material benefits to its supporters in exchange for their votes.^[xxxiii] Such parties are commonly observed in countries with high levels of poverty; the benefits offered include branded clothing, food, and other forms of assistance. Clientelism implies that during election periods, the electorate expects aspiring candidates to provide such inducements. Elections are thus a give-and-take, which some young people use to their advantage. But clientelism is a double-edged sword, aspiring young candidates may lack the material benefits to reward their supporters.

Interviewees agreed that Zimbabwe’s electoral politics is characterised by what is known as the “politics of the belly”. This practice refers to the material items, in particular food, that the electorate expects from political parties and candidates. In Zimbabwe, the politics of the belly thrives among young people, many [BY1] of whom are unemployed.^[xxxiv] Thus, rather than aspiring to stand as candidates, some young people opportunistically take on marginal roles during elections, such as serving as foot soldiers in exchange for material benefits. In the words of a 2024 study, young people’s “vulnerability to unemployment and lack of resources force them to participate in politics in peripheral roles that allow them to survive through benefits extended to them by patronage systems”.^[xxxv]

Gatekeeping by political-party leaderships is another challenge that affects young people who seek political office outside the quota system. In particular, the main opposition party employed a controversial method of selecting candidates called bereka mwana, in which supporters form a queue behind their preferred candidate.^[xxxvi] Three-fifths of the research participants agreed that political parties did not prioritise young candidates. In particular, one young parliamentarian argued that the candidate selection process was not based on age but was a simple case of winner takes all.

Young Zimbabweans therefore continue to be structurally and politically excluded, and evidence shows that the quota system of reserved seats is far from addressing these issues. Structural reforms and an accountable, inclusive governance system are needed to ensure sustained youth representation in the country’s legislature.

Conclusions and recommendations

Youth quotas are an essential tool for encouraging youth representation in national parliaments. Zimbabwe has joined four other countries – Rwanda, Kenya, Morocco, and Uganda – in reserving seats in the legislature for young parliamentarians. While Zimbabwe’s youth quota system is relatively new compared with the more established system of gender quotas, it has already yielded positive results.

This view is validated by GYPI data for Zimbabwe and its neighbours Botswana, Zambia, and Mozambique, which do not have youth quotas. Beyond the reserved seats, Zimbabwe’s youth quota had ripple effects, with more young people standing as candidates in the 2023 elections than in the previous contest. As a result, 17 young people were elected from the country’s 210 constituencies under the normal rules.

Still, beyond the quota’s short-term influence in promoting youth inclusion and representation in parliament, the measure’s sustainability is unclear in the broader context of Zimbabwe’s institutional and political environment. Visible setbacks, including administrative hurdles, nomination fees, gatekeeping by political parties, and an entrenched patronage system, hinder the durability of an open space for youth participation.

To ensure the sustained positive impacts of this representational tool, the quota should be implemented in an environment with youth-friendly administrative guidelines and an open political space. To this end, the following four steps would help ensure sustainable youth representation in Zimbabwe’s parliament.

First, the country’s political parties should either adopt a voluntary candidate quota listing or prioritise young candidates during elections. They should also finance young candidates to promote their effective participation.

Second, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission should ensure its registration centres are in accessible locations to promote the registration of young voters.

Third, the government should revoke the 2022 law that increased the nomination fees for constituency elections and reduce the exorbitant costs of registering a candidacy.

Finally, the women’s quota must be revised to include some reserved seats for young women.

Zimbabwe’s youth quota system is a welcome and progressive instrument, but it needs to be implemented within an ecosystem of youth-friendly electoral norms. While the quota has offered short-term gains for youth representation, its long-term democratic value depends on whether it forms part of a genuinely open political environment. Sustainable youth representation in Zimbabwe’s parliament requires a political and administrative framework conducive to youth participation throughout the electoral cycle.

Explore the Full Study

This chapter is part of a Deep Dive of Young Researchers who worked on Youth Participation for three years. This deep dive is a global collection of 12 case studies unpacking how young people are reshaping political engagement.

The Young Researchers’ Network is an initiative developed in the framework of the European Democracy Hub and EPD’s Women and Youth in Democracy WYDE Civic Engagement project, supported by the European Union.

Get to know the 12 Young Researchers

[i] Drude Darlerup, “Quotas are changing the history of women”, in “The Implementation of Quotas: African Experiences Quota Report Series”, edited by Julie Ballington, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 2004.

[ii] “Youth Participation in National Parliaments: 2023”, Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2023, https://www.ipu.org/resources/publications/reports/2023-10/youth-participation-in-national-parliaments-2023.

[iii] Yvonne Kemper, “Youth Participation in Parliaments and Peace and Security Contribution from the IPU to the Progress Study on Youth, Peace and Security mandated by SC Resolution 2250”, Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2015,

https://www.ipu.org/sites/default/files/documents/tp_youth_participation_in_parliaments_and_peace_and_security_ipu.pdf.

[iv] Kemper, “Youth Participation”.

[v] Andrea Cornwall and Anne Marie Goertz, “Democratizing Democracy: Feminist Perspectives”, Democratization 12, no. 5 (2005): 783–800.

[vi] Gilbert Muruli Khadiagala, Khabele Matlosa, and Victor Shiale, “When Elephants Fight: Preventing and Resolving Election-Related Violence in Africa”, Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa, 2010.

[vii] Rose Jaji, “Youth Masculinities in Zimbabwe’s Congested Gerontocratic Political Space”, Africa Development 45, no. 3 (2020): 77–96.

[viii] “Towards a New National Youth Policy for Zimbabwe”, Youth Empowerment and Transformation Trust (YETT), 2019, https://idl-bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/items/27d119f0-92f9-4d8c-87e3-c853b3c10119.

[ix] “ZESN Report on the 30 July 2018 Harmonised Elections”, Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), 2018, https://www.zesn.org.zw/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ZESN-Preliminary-Statement-on-the-30-July-Harmonised-Elections.pdf.

[x] Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 2) Act, 2021 (Act No. 2 of 2021) S 124 (1) (c).

[xi] “Youth participation in national parliaments”, Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2021, https://www.ipu.org/youth2021.

[xii] “Zimbabwe 2023 Final Report”, European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM), 2023, https://www.ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/download/file/8a8629a88fb836fd018fba27b2b90010/Final+Report+Zimbabwe+2023.pdf.

[xiii] David Adeleke, “The Real Reasons Why Africa’s Young People Vote for Old Men”, Ventures Africa, 2017, http://venturesafrica.com/the-real-reasons-why-africas-youngpeople-vote-for-old-men/.

[xiv] Jaji, “Youth Masculinities”.

[xv] Interviewee no. 2, Harare, March 2025.

[xvi] Fadzai Mutasa and Enock Ndawana, “Youth participation in Zimbabwe’s electoral processes post-2008: Challenges and prospects for peacebuilding”, African Security Review 33, no. 3 (2024): 277–93, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10246029.2024.2377589.

[xvii] Interview data, Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2024.

[xviii] Interview data, Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2024.

[xix] “Global Youth Participation Index”, European Partnership for Democracy (EPD), 2025, https://youthdemocracycohort.com/global-youth-participation-index/.

[xx] “Global Youth”, EPD.

[xxi] “Global Youth”, EPD.

[xxii] “2024 National Youth Day Statement”, ZESN, 2024, https://www.zesn.org.zw/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/2024-National-Youth-Day-Statement-by-ZESN.pdf.

[xxiii] “Towards a New”, YETT.

[xxiv] “Zim Politicians Push for Youth Quota”, Business Times, 24 February 2020, https://businesstimes.co.zw/zim-politicians-push-for-youth-quota/.

[xxv] Lloyd Pswarayi, “Between Rocks and Hard Places – Zimbabwean youth and the challenges of political participation”, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 22 August 2023, https://za.boell.org/en/2023/08/22/between-rocks-and-hard-places-zimbabwean-youth-and-challenges-political-participation.

[xxvi] “Harmonised Elections Report”, ZESN, 2023, https://www.zesn.org.zw/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/ZESN-2023-Harmonised-Election-Report.pdf.

[xxvii] Linda Mujuru, “Zimbabwe’s 1,900% Increase in Fees to Run for Office Excludes Underrepresented Candidates”, Global Press Journal, 23 August 2023, https://globalpressjournal.com/africa/zimbabwe/zimbabwes-1900-increase-fees-run-office-excludes-underrepresented-candidates/.

[xxviii] “Interim Statement of the Commonwealth Observer Group to the 2023 Zimbabwe Harmonised Elections”, The Commonwealth, 2023, https://thecommonwealth.org/interim-statement-commonwealth-observer-group-2023-zimbabwe-harmonised-elections.

[xxix] “Zimbabwe”, EUEOM.

[xxx] “Disbursement of Money to Registered Political Parties”, General Notice 372, 17 March 2023, https://www.veritaszim.net/node/6222.

[xxxi] “Zimbabwe”, EUEOM.

[xxxii] “Zimbabwe”, EUEOM.

[xxxiii] “Harmonised”, ZESN.

[xxxiv] “Africa’s youth are more educated, less employed and less politically engaged than their elders”, Afrobarometer, 17 November 2023, https://www.afrobarometer.org/articles/africas-youth-are-more-educated-less-employed-and-less-politically-engaged-than-their-elders-afrobarometer-study-shows/.

[xxxv] Mutasa and Ndawana, “Youth participation”.

[xxxvi] Patricia Sibanda, “Candidate selection method haunts CCC”, News Day, 28 September 2024, https://www.newsday.co.zw/thestandard/local/article/200032892/candidate-selection-method-haunts-ccc.

The post Chapter 6 by Oripha Chimwara first appeared on Youth Democracy Cohort.

The Cost of Politics for Ghana’s Aspiring Young Parliamentarians

Democracy costs money, and so does politics. Indeed, money plays a critical role in politics, elections, and democracy globally.^[i] Political parties cannot function without financial resources, nor can political debates and campaigns. However, when the cost of politics is too high, it triggers concerns about exclusion.

Ghana’s return to multiparty democracy in 1992 ushered in elections that enabled broad political participation. Yet limited financial resources have hindered fair engagement, creating an exclusionary barrier for groups such as women and young people. Still, Ghana’s rate of youth political participation highlights notable progress and provides an opportunity to create more inclusive pathways for young people to influence policy, assume leadership roles, and shape the nation’s democratic future.^[ii]

Through an intersectional lens that considers youth, gender, and political-party membership, this study seeks to understand the cost of politics in Ghana. Intersectionality explains how overlapping social identities interact to produce unique experiences. Applying an intersectional lens guides participant recruitment and reveals how combined identities shape the costs of politics in ways a single-axis analysis would ordinarily overlook. The study explores how young men and women affiliated with Ghana’s two dominant political parties – the governing National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) – finance their parliamentary aspirations.

Obaa Akua Konadu-Osei holds a PhD in Business Management and is a Teaching Fellow at Maastricht University, with expertise in youth participation, gender equality, and sustainable development across academic, policy, and international development platforms.

Get to know Obaa

Methodology

This chapter is based on an intersectional, qualitative, comparative study involving 12 Ghanaians between the ages 21 of 40 who were hoping to enter parliament: three men and three women from each of the two main parties, the NDC and the NPP. The study received ethical approval from Maastricht University’s Ethical Review Committee.

Interviews were conducted remotely, and participants chose pseudonyms to conceal their identities. To maintain confidentiality, any data that could indirectly identify the participants were hidden. All interviews were conducted before Ghana’s 2024 general elections.

The costs of entering politics

The cost of politics encompasses the many expenses that aspiring candidates incur, from their initial decision to run for election through to their time in office.^[iii] Traditionally framed in economic terms, this cost has been broadened in contemporary studies to emphasise non-financial aspects, such as the social, physiological, emotional, and physical costs that accompany political engagements.^[iv] This study considers both dimensions.

The situation in Ghana

Since Ghana’s return to multiparty democracy in 1992, power has alternated every eight years between the NDC and the NPP, with the two parties dominating the country’s parliament. Party members who want to enter the legislature must first secure the votes of party delegates at primaries. If successful, members become parliamentary candidates on their party’s ticket at the next general elections, which are held every four years.

A 2022 study by the Westminster Foundation for Democracy into the cost of politics in Ghana showed a 59% increase in campaign costs between 2012 and 2016, underscoring that a parliamentary hopeful’s financial capacity is a crucial determinant of their success.^[v]

The country’s de facto two-party, winner-takes-all system concentrates patronage on the winning party, inflating costs.^[vi] Private financing from powerful and wealthy individuals and interest groups for political activities, while common in many democracies, has fuelled widespread dissatisfaction with the culture of money – or vote buying – in Ghana’s political landscape.^[vii] The National Commission for Civic Education, civil society groups, think tanks, academics, and traditional and religious leaders have all warned that excessive monetisation may make politics the exclusive preserve of the wealthy, foster corruption, and undermine participatory and inclusive democratic norms.^[viii]

Political costs

All research participants in this study noted the costly process of securing a spot as their party’s parliamentary candidate. Expenditure can be broadly categorised as travel and transport, social interventions, filing fees, publicity materials, community entry and engagements, gifts for and demands from constituents, or general campaign costs. Community entry, a major pre-primaries expense, involves paying homage to the owners of the land, including traditional and opinion leaders – a common practice in many Ghanaian communities.

The costs of travel and transport and gifts are borne before, during, and after primaries; the other categories typically occur beforehand. All cost elements may be incurred when an individual is chosen as their party’s parliamentary candidate.

Three-quarters of the research participants did not live in the constituency they were seeking to represent (although they did come from those constituencies), requiring frequent travel. Indeed, given the importance of in-person interactions with delegates during campaigns, candidates travel throughout their constituencies multiple times before and after elections. Because of the poor condition of roads in some areas, vehicle maintenance costs contribute significantly to campaign budgets.

The cost of community entry is determined by the number of communities in the candidate’s constituency and the value considered acceptable – either in cash, in kind, or both. Beyond traditional and opinion leaders, delegates and community members also expect gifts and support. In the words of one interviewee: “People call on you for school fees … money to buy food … everything … even money for getting married.”^[ix]

Candidates are expected to continually incentivise delegates and community members before, during, and after the primaries, whether they are successful or not, to maintain support for their party in current and subsequent elections. One interviewee pointed out that incentivising delegates on election day is particularly crucial:

From the day we started the campaign, up until the eve of the elections, we were doing very well in terms of the message we sent to the people, but largely the decider was what monies were shared on the day of elections. That’s what actually makes the decision … the D-day monies [are] very crucial to winning the elections. You can be the one with the best ideas, you can be the one with the best strategy; if this is not supported by money you share on D-day, you can’t win.^[x]

These costs can be so important that interviewees cited limited financial resources as a significant reason for party members’ inability to advance as candidates. Despite the fact that equality is enshrined in Ghana’s constitution, access to finances disproportionately affects women, young people, and the economically disadvantaged.^[xi]

Interviewees acknowledged and valued the NPP’s offer of a 50% rebate on the cost of nomination forms for women, young people, and disabled people. However, overall campaign costs remain high for young people without personal or family financial resources. In particular, many candidates incur high costs in meeting constituents’ demands and engaging with them. As timelines do not govern running costs, this uncertainty discourages individuals without stable finances or financial networks from entering politics.

Sources of funding

Common funding sources for young Ghanaians hoping to enter parliament include personal savings and investments, support from friends or close associates, family support, donations from senior colleagues or party financiers, and prospective contractors. Of these sources, personal savings and investments accounted for “about 90%” of one interviewee’s financing.^[xii]

Although not often, male research participants sometimes sought or received support from senior colleagues or party financiers. For female candidates, however, there was an undertone of the importance of acquiring funding legitimately, which meant distancing themselves from any godfather figure. This difference could be attributed to the fact that women in Ghana are subjected to public demands of higher moral standards than men.^[xiii]

For female politicians, the adage among the Akan people that “a good name is better than riches” holds true. This forms a self-perpetuating cycle in which women are systematically denied the support of senior (male) colleagues who could significantly boost their campaign efforts, given how monetised the process is, considerably reducing women’s chances of being elected.

Other barriers to political participation

Aside from limited financial resources, young Ghanaians seeking to enter parliament face several other barriers to their participation: the practice of vote buying, the tension between funding and independence, the strains of political engagement, and inexperience due to age.

Pressure to accept vote buying

Interviewees alluded to an informal institutionalisation of vote buying arising from excessive monetisation during campaigns.^[xiv] Despite expressing their dissatisfaction with the monetised electoral process, candidates have acquiesced to this practice as the norm. Many lamented the transactional nature of securing the support of delegates and criticised politicians for normalising this practice.

Although the study participants found the practice of incentivising delegates problematic, they also pointed out that money is critical in challenging candidates with existing clout and influence: “You need money to turn heads. If you don’t have money, nobody listens to you. It’s that bad.”^[xv]

Interviewees argued that good ideas alone are not enough to win elections; incentivising delegates, especially on election day, is crucial. They found this practice so entrenched that refusing to do so undermined their prospects from the outset.

Funding needs versus independence

Prospective candidates face the challenge of how to accept essential financial support from friends and family but then preserve their independence once in office. Indeed, they argued that the increasingly monetised pathway to election requires raising funds beyond personal savings.

Funds from friends and family resemble grants: they are nonrepayable, but they create obligations on the recipient. Participants expressed concerns that once elected to a position of power, they may feel beholden to donors and offer favours through procurement contracts, which fuels corruption.^[xvi] In this way, candidates acquiesce to an inevitable cycle of corruption even before being elected.

Financial, health, and emotional strains

An incidental finding of this study was to do with postelection loss and recovery. Research participants discussed three main strains of political engagement: financial, health, and emotional losses. Financially, candidates invest their personal savings in the nomination and election process without an immediate mechanism to recoup that investment if they lose the election. Campaign demands also divert resources away from candidates’ private businesses, stunting growth as funds that could be invested in their businesses are spent on political activities instead. Many worried even more about the losses experienced by family and friends.

Interviewees also discussed the impact of election campaigns on their overall health and well-being. Especially for the nine participants who worked and lived outside their constituencies, long and frequent journeys were necessary to maintain physical interactions with constituents, a critical component of the electoral process. One participant said that he had been involved in a car accident on a major highway during one of his trips to his constituency.

Emotionally, interviewees highlighted that recovery from loss is a process shaped by an individual’s level of resilience and the support of their close circle. Consciously or unconsciously, candidates also bear the burden of the emotions of friends and family who contribute financially to their campaigns.

Regardless of the losses they experienced, participants employed various coping mechanisms. At the personal level, many reported taking a break from their routine to rest, reflect, and regain strength. Others highlighted resilience as critical to their ability to recover.

At the interpersonal level, candidates’ sources of emotional support revealed gendered differences. Men credited not only family and friends but also senior political figures who offered encouragement and mentorship. In contrast, most women cited only their families and friends, underscoring subtle distinctions in the social networks that contributed to their recovery.

The limitations of youth

Finally, the study participants recognised that their political inexperience and limited financial capacity, which contributed to their election defeats, were in part due to their young age:

I remember this very well. A delegate told me I am young and I have more time and so I shouldn’t even contest the primaries but rather throw my weight behind the incumbent … and that was disheartening.^[xvii]

Well, let me put it this way, no one has discouraged me, directly or indirectly, based on my gender as a woman. It’s mostly about me being young and the lack of experience, honestly.^[xviii]

Such rhetoric reflects the gerontocratic ideals that continue to place young people in subordinate political roles grounded in respect for older adults, as young people are often perceived as inexperienced or even irrational.^[xix] Reinforcing these stereotypes leads to disenchantment and discourages young people from actively participating in politics or vying for office.

The way forward

The general dissatisfaction with the financing of political participation in Ghana cuts across gender and party-political divides. In response, the research participants offered a multipronged approach to reduce exclusionary barriers and excessive incentivisation.

Curbing the monetisation of campaigns

Participants appreciated the NPP’s targeted rebates for youth, women, and disabled people in reducing the cost burden for candidates and urged the NDC to adopt similar measures. Yet they recognised that this party-level support cannot offset intersectional disadvantages. For a young woman with limited financial resources who may face gendered stigma when it comes to asking for support, rebates may be necessary but insufficient to cover the high cost of other items.

To check the excessive monetisation of election campaigns, participants called for a two-tier regulatory framework. At the national level, legislation could define permissible expenses, enforce strict spending limits, and ban the use of funds for financial inducements. Complementary party-level statutes could mirror these provisions while offering matching public incentives to reduce genuine outreach costs. If implemented, both tiers must be backed by a national independent body empowered to investigate breaches and impose sanctions.

Reimagining political-party funding

Public and transparent crowdfunding is largely unpopular in Ghana’s current political landscape. However, in the run-up to the 2024 general elections, the two main parties’ presidential candidates, the NDC’s John Mahama and the NPP’s Mahamudu Bawumia, launched digital fundraising platforms.^[xx] The candidate of the New Force, Nana Kwame Bediako, has argued that crowdfunding not only bolsters political integrity but also reduces politicians’ burden of rewarding influential donors.^[xxi] With crowdfunding, the scope of campaign finance is broadened, increasing the participation of party supporters while reducing politicians’ susceptibility to corruption.

Some interviewees suggested that parties could establish centralised campaign pools, funded by candidates and redistributed according to transparent criteria. This collective approach could reduce participants’ urge to outdo their competitors’ incentivisation strategies, as a common spending envelope would guide candidates. Critical to the success of this system, the interviewees emphasised, would be substantial initial contributions backed by rigorous, publicly accessible accounting by party treasuries to ensure fairness, reinforce accountability, and strengthen intraparty cohesion.

Replacing primaries with an electoral college

Research participants recommended replacing Ghana’s delegates-only primary system with an electoral college in which every registered party member in a constituency could determine who is selected as the party’s parliamentary candidate. Under the current system, delegates have become powerful kingmakers whose financial demands, depending on whether they are met or not, can result in benevolent inclusion or punitive exclusion. Interviewees argued that introducing an electoral college would mean a larger pool of kingmakers – too many to provide sizable incentives compared with the status quo.

Political campaigns would therefore be forced to be issue based, while the electoral college would be compelled to vote for the most competent individual, not the highest spender. Even if incentivisation prevails, candidates are most likely to spread their incentives thinly. For example, providing branded T-shirts to 15,000 individuals is more economical than offering sewing machines and television sets to 1,500 delegates. Ultimately, this reform would emphasise substantive policy debates and competence rather than financial clout.

Redefining sociocultural norms on elections

Finally, effective public-awareness campaigns are crucial in addressing Ghanaians’ cultural expectations and perceptions of running for political office. When an individual declares they are competing, there is a general notion that they are financially well resourced and not necessarily that they are standing because of their intentions. Elected politicians have fuelled these perceptions. When the general public observes the significant wealth amassed by politicians in power, the population cannot be blamed for wanting their share of the national cake.

That said, the cycle of corruption can be addressed by creating a culture of shame around the giving and receiving of incentives during elections. By showing the detrimental effects of electing candidates based solely on incentives, a campaign could appeal to the consciences of voters and hopefuls when they request or offer excessive incentives. A shift in societal norms could address the exclusionary barriers faced by financially limited yet competent candidates. Changing these norms would create a new social contract for the way political campaigns are organised.

Voters desire tangible socioeconomic development, both for themselves and in their communities. National governments, through local development authorities, need to ensure such development is equitable. When individuals and communities are empowered, their reliance on incentives from political candidates may be significantly reduced. Breaking this cycle of incentivisation would dismantle the culture of perpetual dependence between delegates and candidates.

Explore the Full Study

This chapter is part of a Deep Dive of Young Researchers who worked on Youth Participation for three years. This deep dive is a global collection of 12 case studies unpacking how young people are reshaping political engagement.

The Young Researchers’ Network is an initiative developed in the framework of the European Democracy Hub and EPD’s Women and Youth in Democracy WYDE Civic Engagement project, supported by the European Union.

Get to know the 12 Young Researchers

[i] Pete Wardle, “Cost of politics: Synthesis report”, Westminster Foundation for Democracy, 2022, https://www.wfd.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/research-wfd-cost-of-politics-synthesis-report.pdf.

[ii] “Explore Youth Participation in Ghana”, Global Youth Participation Index, European Partnership for Democracy, 2025, https://gypi.epd.eu/country-reports/gh.

[iii] “The cost of politics in Ghana”, Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD), 2022, https://www.wfd.org/sites/default/files/2022-02/Cost_Of_Politics_Ghana.pdf.

[iv] Victoria Hasson, The Cost of Politics in South Africa (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2025), https://doi.org/10.4337/9781781953525.00004; Kevin B. Smith, Matthew V. Hibbing, and John R. Hibbing, “Friends, relatives, sanity, and health: The costs of politics”, PloS one 14, no. 9 (2019).

[v] “The cost”, WFD; Wardle, “Cost of politics”.

[vi] George M. Bob-Milliar, “Party youth activists and aggressive political participation in Ghana: A qualitative study of party foot-soldiers’ activism”, APSA 2012 Africa Workshop Paper, 2012.

[vii] Philippe Jacques Codjo Lassou et al., “Monetization of politics and public procurement in Ghana”, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 37, no. 1 (2024): 85–118; Nic Cheeseman, Gabrielle Lynch, and Justin Willis, “Ghana shows a troubling willingness to accept political corruption”, Washington Post, 21 December 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/12/21/yes-ghana-had-a-peaceful-transfer-of-power-but-its-citizens-accept-some-troubling-practices-as-part-of-democracy/.

[viii] “The cost”, WFD; Cheeseman et al., “Ghana”.

[ix] Author interview with Ernest, a male member of the NPP.

[x] Author interview with Tsatsu, a male member of the NDC.

[xi] “The cost”, WFD.

[xii] Author interview with Iddrisu, a male member of the NPP.

[xiii] Dzodzi Tsikata, “Women in Ghana at 50: Still struggling to achieve full citizenship?”, Ghana Studies 10, no. 1 (2007): 163–206.

[xiv] Lassou et al., “Monetization”; Shadrak Bentil and Edmund Poku Adu, “Communication deficit and monetization of political contests at the Electoral Commission of Ghana”, Otoritas: Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan 9, no. 1 (2019): 73–88.

[xv] Author interview with Efe, a female member of the NDC.

[xvi] Lassou et al., “Monetization”; James Yaw Asomah, “Does democracy fuel corruption in developing countries? Understanding Ghanaians’ perspectives”, Democratization 30, no. 4 (2023): 654–72.

[xvii] Author interview with Ernest, a male member of the NPP.

[xviii] Author interview with Patricia, a female member of the NDC.

[xix] Ransford Edward Van Gyampo and Nana Akua Anyidoho, “Youth politics in Africa”, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics 3 (2019): 1–19; Elizabeth Biney and Acheampong Yaw Amoateng, “Youth political participation: A qualitative study of undergraduate students at the University of Ghana”, African Journal of Development Studies 9, special no. 1 (2019): 9.

[xx] Leticia Osei, “Mahama launches digitalized donation platform for his campaign”, Citi Newsroom, 23 March 2023, https://citinewsroom.com/2023/03/mahama-launches-digitalized-donation-platform-for-his-campaign/; “Dr. Mahamudu Bawumia | Donate”, DMB, accessed 3 June 2025, https://bawumia.com/donate/.

[xxi] Daniel Owusu, “Nana Kwame Bediako Launches crowdfunding campaign to avoid political favors”, ModernGhana, 16 January 2024, https://www.modernghana.com/news/1314113/nana-kwame-bediako-launches-crowdfunding-campaign.html.

The post Chapter 3. by Obaa Akua Konadu-Osei first appeared on Youth Democracy Cohort.

Youth Political Participation in Mozambique’s Disconnected Democracy

In recent years, social media have become an integral part of young people’s daily lives. Giving users the ability to connect with others and access information quickly and easily, social media have become a powerful tool for political expression and engagement.[i] As the largest generation in history, today’s young people increasingly use social media to participate in political discourse, share their opinions, and mobilise others to take action.[ii] However, the impacts of social media on youth political participation are not entirely clear, and there is still much debate about whether social media are a force for good or bad in the political sphere.[iii]

On the one hand, social media have enabled young people to take part in political discussions and movements in ways that were previously impossible.[iv] Social media have made it easier for young people to organise and take part in protests, rallies, and other forms of activism.[v] On the other hand, there are concerns about the effects of social media, such as the potential to create echo chambers, in which young people interact only with those who share their views.[vi] Social media can also be used to spread misinformation and propaganda, which can undermine the quality of political discourse and democratic processes.[vii]

Taking Mozambique as a case study, this research investigates the impact of social media on the political participation of young people in the country, including their levels of engagement in political discussions, their attitudes towards political issues, and their participation in campaigns and social movements.[viii] Specifically, the chapter analyses the potential benefits and drawbacks of social media for youth political participation in Mozambique’s 2024 general elections.

Dércio Tsandzana is a Mozambican political scientist whose research explores youth political participation and how digital platforms are reshaping political engagement.

Get to know Dercio

Methodology

The methodology for this research is based on virtual ethnography – or, more precisely, netnography – which is ideal for researching online communities, cultures, and behaviours.[ix] Without the need for direct contact with participants, netnography enables the collection and interpretation of existing digital data. This study concentrated on online discussions and interactions related to Mozambique’s 2024 general elections, paying special attention to the growing political activism linked to the hashtag #PovoNoPoder (People in Power). This digital movement offered a distinct perspective for examining how young people express their political demands, grievances, and activities online.

The study observed a variety of social media platforms, including Facebook, X (previously Twitter), public WhatsApp groups, and TikTok. Over six months from October 2024 to March 2025, observations were made of online conversations, blogs, memes, videos, and comment threads. Relevant posts were identified using the platforms’ own search engines, drawing on hashtags such as #PovoNoPoder, #Moçambique (Mozambique), and #Eleições (Elections). As a researcher and digital media user from Mozambique, this author was able to analyse content in its original linguistic and cultural setting while being mindful of the dangers of personal bias.

This study was influenced by ethical considerations. Although the data was derived from publicly accessible digital content, anonymity and privacy were meticulously maintained. Quotes and posts were gathered exclusively from open forums; closed or private conversations were not included. The visible online political activity is likely to have been skewed towards more connected youth from the urban areas of Maputo and Matola, because internet access is still unequal in Mozambique, especially outside towns and cities.[x]

The study was also limited by the transient nature of digital content, which makes verification and archiving difficult. Posts, accounts, and entire narratives can be erased over time. Because there was no direct connection with the content’s authors, interpretation depends largely on contextual reading, which is perceptive but may miss offline context. This research was also subject to the possible presence of bot accounts and the constraints of limited internet connectivity in Mozambique. These factors may have influenced patterns of online engagement and, consequently, the conclusions drawn from the study.

Mozambique’s internet landscape

The internet has significantly transformed the way people communicate and participate in politics globally. According to data-tracking website DataReportal, in early 2025 there were 17.7 million active mobile phone connections in Mozambique, equating to 50.4% of the country’s total population (figure 1.1).[xi]

Some of these connections might not offer internet access, while others might only have phone and text-messaging services. Still, at the start of 2025, Mozambique’s internet penetration rate was 19.8%, with 6.96 million people using the web. Mozambique had 3.7 million social media user identities, representing 10.5% of the country’s population. Of these users, 58.7% were male and 41.3% were female.

Data from Meta’s advertising resources indicate that Facebook is the most popular social media platform in Mozambique. Facebook’s potential ad reach in the country grew by 500,000 (15.6%) between January 2024 and January 2025, according to Meta’s data. In the three months between October 2024 and January 2025, the number of Mozambicans whom marketers could contact via Facebook advertising rose by 400,000, or 12.1%.[xii]

Barriers to youth political participation

Making up more than 60% of Mozambique’s population, people under 25 are undoubtedly a large constituency, yet historically they have had low levels of formal political participation.[xiii] Many young Mozambicans express a sense of disengagement from electoral politics, citing a lack of faith in political parties, scarce economic opportunities, and an absence of meaningful representation. However, young people have embraced new forms of participation, especially online.[xiv] Political content, memes, satire, and unplanned conversations have exploded on platforms including Facebook, X, and TikTok.

On the European Partnership for Democracy’s Global Youth Participation Index, Mozambique scored 45 out of 100, reflecting a country with immense demographic potential but persistent structural barriers to youth participation.[xv] Young people are a powerful force for political and economic change, yet this potential remains largely untapped. On the index’s political affairs dimension, Mozambique scored 41 out of 100, reflecting young people’s low representation in the country’s parliament, an absence of formal advisory mechanisms, and a lack of youth quotas.

Young people’s involvement in Mozambique’s elections is similarly constrained. On the index’s elections dimension, the country scored 43 out of 100, revealing logistical difficulties, distrust in electoral institutions, and widespread voter apathy. While a national youth policy exists and efforts have been made to strengthen youth inclusion frameworks, the implementation of these measures has been slow. Political parties offer few meaningful entry points for young leaders, and the provision of civic education is inconsistent across the country. Youth political engagement became both a crucial problem and a significant uncertainty in Mozambique’s general elections held on 9 October 2024.

Mozambique’s 2024 general elections

The conduct of the 2024 elections was widely criticised. The late opening of polling stations, irregularities in voter lists, and instances of ballot stuffing in strategic districts were among the numerous problems recorded during the registration and voting stages of the election process.[xvi] International observers and local civil society organisations like Sala da Paz documented and condemned multiple cases of malpractice.

The official results showed that the ruling FRELIMO party retained a majority in parliament, although the election procedure was widely viewed as defective and opaque. This outcome reinforced many young Mozambicans’ feelings of political futility, as their online involvement did not translate into institutional change.[xvii]

The gap between official institutions and the lived realities of the population, especially young people, has become a more prominent topic of discussion since the elections. Although government officials have recognised the significance of youth inclusion, there are still few real mechanisms for engagement. As a result, digital platforms have evolved into venues for identity creation, resistance, and informal political education as well as expression.[xviii]

The 2024 elections therefore provide a critical lens through which to view Mozambique’s changing political landscape, in which young people are establishing alternative forms of engagement, often with humour, defiance, and inventiveness, and traditional channels are increasingly mistrusted.

Case study: #PovoNoPoder

The grassroots slogan-turned-movement #PovoNoPoder rose to prominence in Mozambique’s online public domain ahead of the 2024 elections. #PovoNoPoder is best understood as a symbolic and dispersed form of digital resistance, rather than a formal civil society campaign or an organised political organisation. It acted as a rallying cry for the populace, especially the young, who were fed up with the nation’s established political class, an unreliable electoral system, and institutions’ inability to address the public’s issues. Instead of using traditional modes of protest, the hashtag accompanied humour, memes, slogans, and impromptu commentary to convey a desire for radical political change.

The main players behind #PovoNoPoder were young people with digital connections, many of whom live in metropolitan and peri-urban areas like Maputo, Beira, and Nampula, although the movement lacked official leaders. Among the main actors were university students, rappers, digital artists, meme curators, amateur critics, and anonymous netizens. Crucially, the movement also struck a chord with members of the Mozambican diaspora, who amplified criticism and expressed their solidarity using the hashtag. It was challenging for the government to repress or co-opt #PovoNoPoder, since it functioned in a fluid, decentralised manner, in contrast to typical political groups.

No official political-party plan or civic campaign served as the inspiration for #PovoNoPoder. Rather, it developed organically in mid-2024 on sites like Facebook, WhatsApp, TikTok, and X as online grievances about pre-election anomalies started to flare up. Memes and short videos began to use the phrase while ridiculing the political establishment, particularly FRELIMO’s power and the alleged appropriation of electoral institutions.

The emergence of #PovoNoPoder, which reached its zenith around polling day on 9 October, accompanied a broad public outcry against election irregularities, such as problems with voter registration, claims of intimidation, and erratic correspondence from electoral authorities. Long-standing complaints, like elite impunity, urban inequality, and youth unemployment, added to these annoyances, fostering an environment that was conducive to a digital rupture. Particularly after photos and videos of alleged ballot fraud and disturbances at polling stations went viral, the hashtag’s popularity skyrocketed. The hashtag evolved into a vehicle for political storytelling and internet mobilisation, offering immediate criticism and emotional support at a turbulent moment.

Social media as a political forum

Online discontent continued after the elections. Between October 2024 and March 2025, numerous posts were published on X with the hashtag #PovoNoPoder. Most users, primarily young people, used the hashtag to express their frustration with the ruling party.

In one example, a video clip shows police using tear gas and fighting with teenage protesters on the street.[xix] The excerpt reveals how internet platforms have evolved into venues for recording and challenging state violence in Mozambique. The post highlights the harsh methods used to quell dissent, especially among young people who want to express themselves politically outside established channels. The post serves as both evidence and testimony, turning regular social media use into a political act of resistance and witness.

This example shows how digital media can act as a virtual forum in which young people can reveal abuses and spark public anger. Such videos inspire, motivate, and emotionally energise viewers in addition to providing information. In this way, digital engagement becomes embodied in real feelings of dread, danger, and confrontation, rather than being restricted to hashtags or abstract criticism. Outrage, sadness, and solidarity are key components of the way young people interact with politics in constricted and monitored political environments. In short, social media enable a new kind of affective political participation.

In other posts on X, users, again mainly young people, shared messages with revolutionary undertones, expressing a belief that the time for change had arrived. One such post (translated from Portuguese) read as follows:

This is the best moment to be Mozambican … I am EXTREMELY PROUD of the UNITY we are showing as a people. We are the most united 20% in all of history.
LET’S SAVE MOZAMBIQUE
THE REVOLUTION HAS ALREADY ARRIVED … !!
#SaveMozambique #ThisCountryIsOurs #7November #POVONOPODER[xx]

This post demonstrates the affective and symbolic aspect of young people’s digital political participation in Mozambique. Social media sites like X are used for more than just criticism or satire; they are also employed to create shared feelings, validate identities, and envisage different political futures. The message above uses urgency and an emotionally charged vernacular, rather than formal political language or institutional speech, to evoke a sense of resistance and affiliation. It also illustrates how #PovoNoPoder serves as a discursive forum in which demands for civic unity, national redemption, and dignity come together.

Meanwhile on Facebook, the hashtag #PovoNoPoder was widely shared by young people as a form of support for presidential candidate Venâncio Mondlane, who appropriated the youth protest movement to gain sympathisers and build a political challenge to FRELIMO. Several pages were created with the aim of amplifying the voice of #PovoNoPoder, always in connection with the 2024 elections. This approach was in contrast to the use of the hashtag on X, where the movement appeared less directly tied to the electoral process.

In one Facebook post, for example, a video shows young people protesting in the streets of Maputo and driving the police away from a meeting point.[xxi] The police, who are typically the aggressors, are shown as being pushed back by the very young people they are trying to suppress. In the post, the video is accompanied by Mondlane’s name and the hashtag #PovoNoPoder.

The way that digital platforms are used to combine informal activism with official political processes is one example of how youth political participation and social media in Mozambique are changing. Facebook has become a platform on which symbolic opposition is more overtly translated into electoral engagement, in contrast to X, where the hashtag #PovoNoPoder often functioned as a more general symbol of resistance and collective frustration. In another post on Facebook, a call to action urges young people to act for change and stop the violence.[xxii] Much of the youth-led digital mobilisation during Mozambique’s 2024 elections was marked by emotion and urgency for change.

It is worth noting that the durability of young Mozambicans’ digital political involvement is also impacted by the cyclical nature of elections and the volatility of online attention. Digital movements often pick up steam during political crises or election contests, but once the current event is over, this intensity usually fades.

This transience raises fundamental questions about whether online energy is being channelled into longer-term forms of civic participation, institution building, or community organising. Young activists often find it difficult to sustain their projects because of inadequate civic infrastructure, scarce resources, and a lack of supportive institutional processes. Consequently, postelection periods are marked by declines in digital engagement, highlighting the challenges of converting episodic online mobilisation into sustained political influence within Mozambique’s evolving democratic landscape.

Conclusion

More than just a political struggle, Mozambique’s 2024 general elections revealed how youth political participation in the digital age is changing and often conflictual. Social media platforms have emerged as crucial forums for the expression of dissatisfaction, the formation of identities, and alternative conceptions of power, even though many young people have lost faith in traditional politics.[xxiii] Movements like #PovoNoPoder show that young people in Mozambique are not passive; rather, they are actively involved, albeit often outside established political systems. Their involvement is multifaceted, ranging from confrontational to symbolic to increasingly digital. But there are conflicts in these interactions, too.

Youth engagement runs the risk of losing its transformative and moral force when it becomes enmeshed with party-political objectives or reflects the violence it aims to oppose. These inconsistencies highlight Mozambique’s larger fight to democratise public space, both real and virtual, as well as institutions. In Mozambique, youth political engagement follows nonlinear and ill-defined paths. These are full of opportunity, innovation, and resistance, but they are also shaped by history and limited by systemic injustices.

The challenge is not to ask whether young Mozambicans are political but to acknowledge and support the various complicated and sometimes unsettling ways in which they are already changing the political landscape – post by post, hashtag by hashtag, and, when necessary, voice by voice in the streets.

Explore the Full Study

This chapter is part of a Deep Dive of Young Researchers who worked on Youth Participation for three years. This deep dive is a global collection of 12 case studies unpacking how young people are reshaping political engagement.

The Young Researchers’ Network is an initiative developed in the framework of the European Democracy Hub and EPD’s Women and Youth in Democracy WYDE Civic Engagement project, supported by the European Union.

Get to know the 12 Young Researchers

[i] Manuel Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age (London: Polity, 2012).

[ii] Brian Loader et al., “The networked young citizen: social media, political participation and civic engagement”, Information, Communication & Society 17, no. 2 (2014): 143–50.

[iii] James Sloam and Matt Henn, Youthquake 2017: The Rise of Young Cosmopolitans in Britain (London: Palgrave, 2019).

[iv] Antonio Cortés-Ramos et al., “Activism and Social Media: Youth Participation and Communication”, Sustainability 13, no. 18 (2021): 10485.

[v] Lance Bennett and Alexandra Segerberg, “The logic of connective action: Digital media and the personalization of contentious politics”, Information, Communication & Society 15, no. 5 (2012): 739–68.

[vi] Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet is Hiding from You (Penguin UK, 2011).

[vii] Samuel Woolley and Philip Howard, Computational Propaganda: Political Parties, Politicians, and Political Manipulation on Social Media (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

[viii] Dércio Tsandzana, “Reporting on Everyday Life: Practices and Experiences of Citizen Journalism in Mozambique”, in New Journalism Ecologies in East and Southern Africa. Palgrave Studies in Journalism and the Global South, edited by Trust Matsilele, Shepherd Mpofu, and Dumisani Moyo (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023).

[ix] Robert Kozinets, Netnography: Redefined (London: Sage Publications, 2016).

[x] Tsandzana, “Reporting”.

[xi] Simon Kemp, “Digital 2025: Mozambique”, DataReportal, 3 March 2025, https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2025-mozambique.

[xii] Kemp, “Digital 2025”.

[xiii] “Mozambique Data”, World Bank, 2025, https://data.worldbank.org/country/mozambique.

[xiv] Dércio Tsandzana, “Redes Sociais da Internet como ‘Tubo de Escape’ Juvenil no Espaço Político-Urbano em Moçambique” [Internet Social Networks as a Youth “Escape Tube” in the Political-Urban Space in Mozambique], Cadernos de Estudos Africanos 40, no. 2 (2020): 167–89.

[xv] “Explore Youth Participation in Mozambique”, Global Youth Participation Index, European Partnership for Democracy, 2025, https://gypi.epd.eu/country-reports/mz.

[xvi] Zenaida Machado, “Mozambique’s Ruling Party Wins Elections Amid Nationwide Protests”, Human Rights Watch, 2024, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/10/24/mozambiques-ruling-party-wins-elections-amid-nationwide-protests.

[xvii] Domingos Getimane et al., “Impact of news consumption on social media during the 2024 electoral campaign in Mozambique”, Insight – News Media 7, no. 1 (2024): 668.

[xviii] “Mozambique: Post-Election Internet Restrictions Hinder Rights”, Human Rights Watch, 2024, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/11/06/mozambique-post-election-internet-restrictions-hinder-rights.

[xix] Moz Informa, “!!! Na Av. Eduardo Mondlane” [!!! On Eduardo Mondlane Avenue], X, 22 November 2024, accessed 30 November 2025, https://x.com/mozinforma/status/1859925353088864538?s=20.

[xx] O Tigre Branco, “Esse é o melhor momento para ser um Moçambicano” [This is the best moment to be Mozambican], X, 5 November 2024, accessed 30 November 2025, https://x.com/Cheque_Senpai/status/1853872286970900622.

[xxi] Kelven Mídia, “A população contra a Polícia da República de Moçambique” [The population against the police of the Republic of Mozambique], Facebook, 24 October 2024, accessed 30 November 2025, https://www.facebook.com/kelvenmidia/videos/855214910098840/.

[xxii] DW Africa, “Artistas em protesto contra violência eleitoral em Moçambique” [Artists protest against electoral violence in Mozambique], Facebook, 14 December 2024, accessed 4 February 2026, https://www.facebook.com/dw.portugues/videos/artistas-em-protesto-contra-viol%C3%AAncia-eleitoral-em-mo%C3%A7ambique/1615312362693107/.

[xxiii] Dércio Tsandzana, “Juventude urbana e redes sociais em Moçambique: a participação política dos ‘conectados desamparados’” [Urban youth and social networks in Mozambique: The political participation of the “connected but helpless”], Sociedade e Comunicação 34, no. 2 (2018): 235–50.

The post Chapter 1. by Dércio Tsandzana first appeared on Youth Democracy Cohort.

The 2025 mid-term elections in the Philippines, held under the administration of Ferdinand Marcos Jr., saw strong voter engagement, with over 68 million registered voters and an 82% turnout. Yet, beneath this high participation lies a political system shaped by entrenched inequalities. Electoral politics remains dominated by clientelism and political dynasties, where access to financial resources and established networks largely determines who can run (and win) public office.

This study highlights how the cost of politics creates significant barriers to entry, particularly for women, youth, and non-dynastic candidates. Campaign spending in the Philippines extends far beyond the official campaign period, with substantial “unofficial” costs incurred beforehand. Advertising represents the single largest expense, alongside costly surveys used to gauge and influence voter sentiment. Vote buying, though complex and informal, remains deeply embedded in electoral practices and continues to shape outcomes.

Incumbent politicians benefit from access to public resources, including discretionary funds and constituency-based allocations, giving them a structural advantage in re-election campaigns. Combined with weak political parties that are often personality-driven and prone to shifting alliances, this results in elections that are less about policy debate and more about name recognition and financial capacity.

These dynamics disproportionately exclude newcomers. Women in politics tend to come from wealthy or politically connected families, while youth representation remains extremely limited, especially for those outside political dynasties. Weak enforcement of campaign finance rules and outdated electoral regulations further compound these challenges.

The study calls for comprehensive reforms to level the playing field. These include overhauling electoral laws, strengthening oversight of campaign finance, regulating political dynasties, and investing in civic education to combat vote buying. It also emphasises the need to support more inclusive political participation by equipping parties and civil society with tools to promote gender equality and youth engagement. Ultimately, reducing the cost of politics is essential to making democratic participation in the Philippines more accessible, competitive, and representative.

This study is supported by the WYDE Civic Engagement project, which aims to empower youth in democratic processes. Through this research, the Cost of Politics reports unlock the unique processes of electoral participation and their impact on democracy in different countries.

The post What is the cost of running for office in Philippines? first appeared on Youth Democracy Cohort.

A WYDE Civic Engagement Research Project

This study follows naturally from the research carried out under the leadership of INTPA G1 on electoral procurement costs during 2021-2022. The earlier publications marked the EU’s first comprehensive methodological effort to shed light on one of the most elusive yet crucial aspects of technical assistance: electoral procurement.

The EDGE Foundation, in line with its mandate as an electoral knowledge facilitator and capacity builder, sought to bridge these initial efforts with the Women and Youth in Democracy (WYDE) – Civic Engagement project, which focuses on strengthening youth participation in the electoral process.

Voter registration remains the most costly, time-consuming and contentious component of many electoral processes. For young people in particular, it is often the main structural obstacle to meaningful participation in elections and public life. Shedding light on voter registration practices and the specific challenges faced by youth is, therefore, a necessary step toward removing entry barriers. Ensuring that every young person is on the voter register is an important democratic objective in its own right  – not merely stage one of improving youth turnout on election day.

To this purpose, we selected 12 cases studies from around the world where a CSO group with a strong youth empowerment vocation could investigate and document existing initiatives and practices to eliminate or mitigate youth participation barriers, while at the same time promoting voting rights for youth and measure their overall impact on voter registration costs. The cases were selected to cover the following criteria:  a) recent voter registration exercises in contexts with a large youth population, b) cases of passive voter registration systems (civil registry-based voter registration), c) cases of active voter registration systems ( ad hoc voter registration), d) cases of transition from active to passive voter registration; e) cases with increasing technology applications in voter registration processes and f) cases where legislative efforts have been made to lower the voting age criteria and increase youth vote.

This journey has taken us to highlight together with our partners measures and methods with which traditional barriers to voter registration have been addressed in very different geo-political contexts, to recognize measures that are generally effective to enhance youth inclusion and to detail the aspects of voter registration that have a significant impact on youth participation (systems, distance of targeted population from registration centers, modalities, fees, information campaigns, placement of registration centers, technology involved, biometric measures required.

Conclusion 

Youth engagement is indispensable for the vitality and ongoing renewal of democratic systems. The case studies demonstrate that young voters increasingly expect streamlined, digitally enabled registration procedures and systems characterised by transparency and accountability.

Reforming voter registration and responsibly promoting digital solutions can lower barriers and empower young voices. Each step, however, must carefully balance the protection of personal data with the imperatives of accountability and oversight, ensuring that voter registration serves democracy – not digital authoritarianism. Transparency and access to information thus remain fundamental pillars of trust in voter registers and in those who administer them.

Technology remains a double-edged sword at every stage of youth democratic engagement. It can be deployed repressively to discourage or control participation, yet it is also one of the most powerful –and most cost-effective – enablers of youth involvement. Our responsibility is to ensure that its responsible, inclusive and creative use prevails.

Election costs remain non-transparent or difficult to scrutinise in most of the countries covered by these case studies, and comprehensive data on youth participation is generally unavailable. Addressing these gaps should constitute a priority for civil society advocacy and a focus for donor engagement. 

The case studies recommend a range of interventions to remove or mitigate existing barriers to participation in active registration systems – many of which rely on technology to simplify administrative processes. Important lessons have emerged from effective youth-focused registration campaigns in which the choice of medium, style and messenger is carefully attuned to young people’s preferences.

Nevertheless, passive registration emerges clearly as the most effective means of eliminating administrative barriers to registration. Automatic registration alone cannot be expected to enhance electoral participation. 

As observed in numerous case studies, the most significant obstacle to participation is a profound deficit of trust. The Philippines case study similarly notes that “there is a prevailing scepticism regarding representative democracy and the impact of an individual’s vote. This socio-cultural barrier leads to disconnection from the democratic process and widespread voter apathy and disillusionment. It also fuels failure to register.” Young respondents across all studies report significant distrust of political institutions, especially political parties. Their experiences often involve marginalisation and a sense of powerlessness, which fosters apathy or cynicism.

To address disengagement, most case studies advocate substantial investment in high-quality, curriculum-based civic and voter education in schools, as well as in youth-oriented outreach campaigns conducted by civil society. Yet the challenge is deeper and more structural. What emerges clearly is the inadequacy of top-down approaches: meaningful progress requires that young people be listened to with care and seriousness so that the successes, such as those identified in this research, can be effectively maintained and extended.

The nonparticipation of any demographic group in the electoral process diminishes democratic legitimacy. But the non-participation of young people in democratic life constitutes a very specific challenge both in the short and long term. Political apathy and disengagement among youth result in less responsive representation, poorer political services and a general decline in democratic stability. Sustaining democracy, therefore, depends on ensuring that young people see themselves not as spectators but as the actors in shaping their political future.

Author: Robert Adams
Editorial Advisor: Domenico Tuccinardi
Research Coordinator: Arba Murati

Case studies by country

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This study was produced by EDGE Foundation and supported by the WYDE Civic Engagement project, which aims to empower youth in democratic processes. Through this research, the Youth Voters Registration Costs and Challenges reports unlock the unique processes of electoral participation and their impact on democracy in different countries. 

The post Youth Voter Registration Costs and Challenges first appeared on Youth Democracy Cohort.

This report on the Cost of Politics in Malaysia, based on research conducted in 2025, explores the financial, institutional and social burdens faced by candidates and parties in a political system undergoing transition. With an expanded electorate following the drop in voting age to 18 and automatic registration, and the recent emergence of a broader coalition government, the study captures how money, party dynamics and structural factors shape access to political power in Malaysia.

While Malaysia’s parliamentary system combined with multi-party competition is often promoted as inclusive, the reality is more challenging. Candidates reported significant expenses across the electoral cycle, from nomination fees to campaign logistics and post-election constituency commitments. with many relying on personal assets or business networks. The embedded role of party hierarchies, informal patronage and opaque nomination processes further concentrates influence in the hands of senior party actors.

Despite some promising signals, for example, concerted efforts to improve women’s political participation  younger candidates, women and those lacking established patronage networks remain under-represented. Female aspirants in particular face disproportionate emotional and financial burdens. The report highlights how unequal access to funding, internal party gatekeeping and informal cost barriers create entry hurdles, undermine fair competition and risk entrenching political inequality as Malaysia’s democratic institutions evolve.

This study is supported by the WYDE Civic Engagement project, which aims to empower youth in democratic processes. Through this research, the Cost of Politics reports unlock the unique processes of electoral participation and their impact on democracy in different countries.

The post What is the cost of running for office in Malaysia? first appeared on Youth Democracy Cohort.

While South Africa’s proportional representation system is often seen as a pathway to inclusivity, the reality is more complex. Candidates reported campaign spending ranging from R17,000 to R1 million, with personal finances often covering costs (especially for those from smaller parties or independents). The internal dynamics of closed-party lists further concentrate influence in the hands of party leadership, making nominations competitive and opaque.

Despite positive signs such as 41.9% female candidates, young people remain underrepresented, and female aspirants in particular face disproportionate emotional and financial burdens. The report highlights how unequal access to funding, especially for newcomers, creates barriers to entry, undermines fair competition, and risks entrenching political inequality in South Africa’s evolving democracy.

This study is supported by the WYDE Civic Engagement project, which aims to empower youth in democratic processes. Through this research, the Cost of Politics reports unlock the unique processes of electoral participation and their impact on democracy in different countries.

The post What is the cost of running for office in South Africa? first appeared on Youth Democracy Cohort.