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Hamse Hirsi Hayd is an investigative journalist, documentary producer, and digital rights advocate working at the intersection of media, youth engagement, and democratic accountability in the Horn of Africa.

He serves as Deputy Executive Director at CBA TV and leads Hayd Network, where he produces high-impact multimedia content focused on governance, transparency, climate resilience, digital rights, and civic participation. His work
amplifies underrepresented voices — particularly youth and young women — and promotes safe, informed participation in digital and public spaces.

Hamse has collaborated with regional and international partners on projects addressing digital literacy, online safety, youth political inclusion, and public interest storytelling. Through data-driven reporting and community-centered narratives, he contributes to strengthening democratic culture and responsible digital engagement in fragile and emerging contexts.

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The project Digital Rights For Democratic Participation In Somalia engages with government institutions to strengthen respect for human and political rights in Somalia’s digital sphere, ensuring that policies and practices reflect democratic principles and protect citizens’ digital freedoms, with the active inclusion of youth and civil society voices in shaping these reforms.

Activities

• Advocacy Oriented Research On The State Of Digital Democracy in Somalia
• Research Launch and Multi-stakeholder Policy Dialogue

Expected outcomes

Production of a set of policy recommendations highlighting opportunities for concrete improvements in governance, regulatory practice, and protection of digital rights.

Establishment of a sustainable advocacy model that builds trust, strengthens accountability, and creates an enabling environment for digital rights and democratic participation.

Catalyse measurable shifts in institutional attitudes and practices, and ensure youth and civil society perspectives are embedded in policy processes

About Digital Shelter

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Digital Shelter is a Somalia-based organisation empowering youth and communities through digital skills, media literacy, and technology-driven solutions. We promote democracy, civic engagement, online safety, and human rights, helping young people use digital tools to drive positive social and political change.

The post Digital Shelter first appeared on Youth Democracy Cohort.

Young people are mobilising more than ever before for democracy. Hopes are high that the young can act as a democratic catalyst to turn back the powerful wave of authoritarianism across the world. But is this really possible? This report examines what is driving young people to mobilise, how powerful their engagement is, and what kinds of political participation they are developing. Much is written about youth participation; this report gives the word to young people from around the world to let them speak on these issues. They correct some of the conventional wisdom about youth political participation and reveal the complex dynamics of young people’s role in and for democracy today.

The issue has become vitally important. The year 2025 witnessed a surge in youth-led protests, mainly associated with Generation Z, and many revolts have continued into 2026. The large-scale mobilisation of young people has reignited debates on political representation, participation, resilience, and democratic renewal. Common patterns emerge across countries that have witnessed youth-led mobilisations over the past year, despite the diversity of the contexts. Limited economic opportunities, persistent inequalities, restrictions on civic freedoms and expression, and entrenched political elitism all contribute to mounting frustration among young people.

Despite much comment and analysis, the critical question remains insufficiently explored: are current political systems, institutions, and governance models open and responsive to youth participation?

There might be no single answer as to whether increased youth political participation directly strengthens and sustains democracies. But one principle stands firm: inclusive democracy depends on broad societal engagement, including from the largest age cohort globally – young people.^[i] Yet political representation of the younger generation remains disproportionately low, and not just because of increasing disillusionment with politics among young people. Despite the youth’s demographic strength, political systems are often closed, exclusionary, and at times openly resistant to meaningful youth participation.

Entering political spaces can be extremely challenging for young people, who face a range of structural and cultural barriers. These include the high costs, both monetary and non-monetary, of running for office; age-related eligibility restrictions; closed or unfair electoral processes; gender inequality; and sociopolitical environments that are often unsupportive of or discouraging to youth leadership.^[ii] These intersecting obstacles significantly reduce young people’s motivation and the appeal of formal political engagement.[iii]

This report dissects the different ways in which young civic and political actors are responding to these challenges. It offers an unprecedented range of case studies from all world regions, undertaken by young experts close to these debates. The report challenges the view of young people as a homogeneous group of disillusioned and disengaged citizens. It points instead to a variety of forms of youth-led political participation and explores the implications of these strategies for democratic change. Young people emerge as a democratic catalyst, but not necessarily in the ways often assumed to be the case.

The power of data: the Global Youth Participation Index

This report flows from a new index designed to highlight trends in youth participation. Recognising the essential value of research and data for driving change for youth participation, the European Partnership for Democracy (EPD) launched the first-ever Global Youth Participation Index (GYPI) in 2025. The GYPI tracks and compares data on youth participation from 141 countries across four dimensions: political affairs, the socioeconomic context, elections, and civic space. According to the index, low scores, particularly on the political affairs dimension, are not limited to regions where democracy is new or fragile but are a global phenomenon.^[iv]

The GYPI does not show uniform disengagement, which is often assumed to be the main feature of young people’s attitudes to politics. Rather, the trends are nuanced and varied across contexts. In many places, apparent disengagement from traditional forms of politics has been challenged by other forms of participation whose democratic potential has been ignored or undermined.

Across these alternative forms, many turn to informal spaces, particularly social media and other digital platforms, to express their views, organise, and mobilise. Online engagement has significantly expanded the opportunities for youth participation, but it also poses considerable risks and threats. Digital spaces are not safe from the rapid spread of radical, extremist, and populist narratives, many of which deliberately target young people’s vulnerabilities.

All of this is happening in the context of rapidly shrinking and even closing civic space. Another important finding of the GYPI is that civic space tends to be more open to youth participation than do political affairs or elections. Research also shows that young people have been experiencing a move from apathy to antipathy, as the young seem to be increasingly embracing illiberal preferences and hostility towards democratic institutions whose structures and performance are no longer deemed adequate to respond to young citizens’ needs.[v]

Lessons and insights

To complement the GYPI with qualitative research, the EPD commissioned case studies from members of our Young Researchers’ Network. Their 12 chapters provide a rich breadth and depth of information and examples that shed new light on youth participation.^[vi]

The following studies weave together research and policy findings on youth engagement. They lay out recommendations to promote and sustain a meaningful and transformative approach to youth participation in both formal and informal decision-making. The case studies offer diverse, thought-provoking, and timely reflections on the challenges and opportunities of youth engagement in different contexts. From the studies, five key messages and insights emerge.

First, all contributions point to the need to move beyond the simple question of whether young people engage, and instead to focus on how youth engagement takes place and why it assumes particular forms. This shift in perspective allows for a more nuanced understanding of the drivers, modalities, and motivations that underlie youth participation.

Second, the contributions suggest a mixed picture with regard to the claim that young people prefer informal forms of engagement over mainstream political participation. While some authors do highlight this tendency, others reveal an increasing willingness among young people to challenge thestatus quo by seeking to transform political channels and institutional structures from within.

Third, several of the challenges identified in the contributions operate at the macro level, whereas others are rooted in the micro-context of specific national settings. This duality underscores the importance of engaging simultaneously with broad, structural trends and specific local realities.

Fourth, the case studies demonstrate that the role of a specific regime – or the broader political context under analysis – is more significant in explaining variations in outcomes than are the differences between young people and other segments of the population. In other words, contextual political factors often outweigh generational divides in shaping patterns of engagement.

Last but not least, an in-depth reading of the contributions highlights a paradox. On the one hand, survey data indicates that a growing number of young people are drawn towards illiberal values, parties, and/or regimes. On the other hand, illiberal regimes often impose such restrictions on youth engagement that they push young people towards more radical positions in defence of fundamental liberal rights. These two dynamics coexist and interact, dispelling an overly simplistic narrative that portrays young people as moving inexorably and uniformly closer to authoritarianism.

Case studies

The report presents the following 12 case studies, which explore the diverse layers and angles of youth participation.

Dércio Tsandzana analyses Mozambique’s #PovoNoPoder movement and its online engagement to challenge the narrative of the country’s young people as passive, instead portraying them as closely involved outside the traditional political system. However, Tsandzana also highlights the contradictions and non-linear evolution of this youth engagement, bringing to the fore the valuable contributions of young Mozambicans through digital activism.

Mehmet İlhanlı discusses how the securitisation of young people in Türkiye, which intensified after the 2013 Gezi Park protests, has constrained and reshaped their political engagement. According to İlhanlı, young people are the demographic most affected by the country’s democratic decline, as they are being excluded, stigmatised, and securitised. Despite young people’s efforts to seek alternative spaces for political expression and activism, their continued stigmatisation by the government will have a profound negative impact on Türkiye’s democratisation.

Obaa Akua Konadu-Osei writes about the cost of politics in Ghana, with a particular focus on the intersection between youth and gender as well as the way in which access to financial resources creates a barrier to parliamentary aspirations. The case study highlights the fundamental challenges young Ghanaians face in fully entering democratic channels, even when they are highly engaged and mobilised in the country’s political landscape. Such obstacles, according to Konadu-Osei, are similar for women and youth, implying a need to rethink political-party funding to give young people fairer access to the political system.

Ajda Hedžet investigates the Free El Hiblu 3 campaign to explore how young migrant men claim their voice from the margins of systems that often silence them. The case highlights the limits of institutional recognition, the criminalisation of young migrants, and the digital struggle for justice. It illustrates how political agency and demands for justice are enacted outside formal institutions. The campaign underscores that Europe’s migration governance is both a site of contestation and a front line for democratic renewal.

Olga Paredes Brítez carries out a comparative analysis of municipal youth policies in Buenos Aires (Argentina) and Asunción (Paraguay). Both municipalities have adopted a vision of young people as “adults in the making” – an adult-centric approach that hinders the recognition and empowerment of young people as full political subjects. The case study provides an additional layer of analysis through the perspective of municipal-level youth engagement and discusses the decentralisation and municipalisation processes in the two countries.

Oripha Chimwara explores the impact of Zimbabwe’s quota system of reserved parliamentary seats for young candidates in creating positive ripple effects for youth engagement in the country. Chimwara also analyses the obstacles to young Zimbabweans’ political participation that remain despite this positive step: administrative hurdles, the cost of politics, and a pervasive patronage system.

Mark Ortiz examines intergenerational politics through the 1970 United Nations (UN) World Youth Assembly, highlighting the complexities of youth representation and the lessons for multilateral engagement today. Ortiz compares this gathering with the UN’s 2024 Summit of the Future, where meaningful youth participation was central in reflecting commitments in the UN’s Youth2030 strategy. The two cases illustrate the enduring impact of youth leadership on the ethos and practice of multilateralism.

Ellie Catherall analyses how and to what extent young people’s voices were represented and included in the drafting of Chile’s 2023 proposed constitution. The analysis shows that despite young people’s view that a new constitution should be representative of Chilean society, the dominance of right-wing parties in the drafting process meant the status quo was maintained. Besides this exclusion of youth voices, young Chileans also felt increasingly detached from the process because of a lack of reliable and impartial information.

Wasal Naser Faqiryar describes how young people in Afghanistan are finding alternative channels to express their grievances, ideas, and dreams to counter the oppressive grip of the Taliban regime. Faqiryar identifies art and other creative forms of expression as fundamental avenues that remain possible, as they pass under the radar of the regime’s control. The chapter also discusses social media as an important platform for the amplification and diffusion of the concerns, needs, and desires of young Afghans.

Ambar Kumar Ghosh presents the importance of youth representation in the democratic life of India, a country with a large young population. The analysis looks at the most significant challenges for young Indians in engaging in parliamentary politics: the cost of politics, the role of established parties in nominating young candidates, disillusionment about political careers, the pervasiveness of dynastic politics, and gender disparities. Ghosh argues that granting young people access to legislative politics would have a positive impact on India’s governance structures.

Dechen Rabgyal explains the minimal engagement of Bhutan’s young people in traditional politics through the lens of democratic elitism. Rabgyal shows how despite civil and democratic programmes equipping young Bhutanese to run for office, a requirement for parliamentary candidates to have at least 10 years’ professional experience reproduces inequalities and excludes a significant portion of Bhutan’s young people from the country’s legislature. The case study highlights the importance of adopting a more realistic approach to ensuring youth engagement.

Finally, Intifar Chowdhury writes about the evolving political relevance of mainstream parties in Australia, analysing how younger generations, disillusioned with traditional parties, are moving away from them. Chowdhury highlights a disconnect between the political priorities of younger voters and traditional political parties, which creates a risk of dealignment. In addition, the chapterexamines how young Australians are more closely linked to issue-based politics, on topics such as climate change, education, and housing, than to traditional party-political divisions.

These case studies aim to spark important discussions of the multiple layers and dimensions of youth political participation. Beyond highlighting diverse experiences and approaches, they provide insights that can inform research and advocacy for more meaningful youth involvement. We encourage readers to engage with these studies, which can support efforts to strengthen young people’s agency and influence. In an age when so much hinges on youth participation, this report gives a voice to a unique range of young writers from around the world to shape these debates.

Ana Mosiashvili is a research and programmes manager at the European Partnership for Democracy (EPD).

Sara Canali is a doctoral researcher at Ghent University and UNU-CRIS.

Explore the Full Study

The Young Researchers’ Network is an initiative developed in the framework of the European Democracy Hub and EPD’s Women and Youth in Democracy WYDE Civic Engagement project, supported by the European Union.

Get to know the 12 Young Researchers

^[i] “United Nations Sustainable Development Goals”, United Nations, https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/youth/.

^[ii] “Cost of Politics”, Westminster Foundation for Democracy, https://costofpolitics.net/.

[iii] Gerardo Berthin, “Why Are Youth Dissatisfied with Democracy?”, Freedom House, 14 September 2023, https://freedomhouse.org/article/why-are-youth-dissatisfied-democracy.

^[iv] Brit Anlar et al., “The Global Youth Participation Index: Report 2025”, European Partnership for Democracy, 2025, https://gypi.studiopompelmoes.eu/assets/images/GYPI-Final-Report.pdf.

[v] Roberto Foa and Yascha Mounk, The Danger of Deconsolidation: The Democratic Disconnect (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Kennedy School, 2019).

^[vi] “The Young Researchers’ Network”, Youth Democracy Cohort, https://youthdemocracycohort.com/the-young-researchers-network/.

The post How Young People Are Redefining Political Participation first appeared on Youth Democracy Cohort.

Can Democratic Elitism Explain Bhutan’s Minimal Youth Political Participation?

Ever since Bhutan’s introduction of democracy in 2008, a recurring question has been why so few young people are involved in the country’s politics. A 2018 study observed that even students of political science do not see politics as “something that they can care about”.^[i] The need for a more realistic approach to encouraging youth political engagement has been raised time and again.

Bhutan has a respectable record in the European Partnership for Democracy’s 2025 Global Youth Participation Index (GYPI), with an overall score of 63 out of 100.^[ii] A closer analysis, however, underlines the recurrent challenge of how to boost the political participation of young Bhutanese. While Bhutan’s score of 81 out of 100 on the index’s socioeconomic dimension pushes the country’s average upwards, the score for political affairs is a meagre 55 out of 100.

With an estimated 51% of its population of almost 800,000 under the age of 30, Bhutan is a youthful nation.^[iii] The puzzle of why a country with a large young population has such low youth engagement can be studied in the context of Bhutan’s strict eligibility criteria for parliamentary candidates.

Bhutan’s parliament consists of the Druk Gyalpo (the monarch), the National Council, and the National Assembly.^[iv] The National Council has 25 members: five eminent persons nominated by the Druk Gyalpo and one elected member from each of the country’s 20 districts.

In August 2022, the Election Commission of Bhutan adopted a rule requiring candidates for the National Council to have at least 10 years of professional experience, and candidates for the National Assembly to have five or more years’ experience.^[v] These criteria were in addition to the existing constitutional provision of a minimum age of 25 as well as the 2008 election act, which required all candidates to have an undergraduate degree.

The requirement of professional experience points to an elitist approach to democracy. As young people necessarily have fewer years of experience than their older counterparts, the 10-year rule for the National Council effectively made electoral politics the preserve of older, educated adults. As a result, youth participation in Bhutan’s mainstream politics remained low.

Drawing on the stories of four aspiring parliamentary candidates, this chapter reveals how Bhutan’s strict experience requirement cancels out the successes of young people’s initial political socialisation.

Dechen Rabgyal is an author and aspiring social scientist whose work draws on his rural Bhutanese upbringing and international education to examine public policy challenges and socio-political change in Bhutan.

Get to know Dechen

Methodology

To explain the minimal level of political participation among young people in Bhutan, this study focuses on the concept of democratic elitism. Elitism is understood here to refer to an outlook that favours those with good educational qualifications and a high level of professional experience.

Through this lens, the study examines the factors that affect youth participation in Bhutan’s electoral politics. The research brought together four aspiring National Council candidates, including one former National Council member. None of the participants could run for election as they did not meet the 10-year experience criterion.

All four research participants took part in semistructured interviews that allowed for a deeper understanding of the respondents’ beliefs, attitudes, and opinions. Three of the participants also engaged in a focus group discussion, which provided exposure to group language and narratives by exploring specific topics among people of similar backgrounds and experiences.^[vi] Held virtually, the discussion covered youth political participation, young people’s motivations to run for office, and the implications of recent electoral laws.

To maintain their confidentiality, the four participants were given the pseudonyms Dawa, Karma, Norbu, and Phuntsho.

Bhutan’s election rules

The rule of law is a foundation for any democratic polity. As one interviewee, Phuntsho, stated: “Laws should create enabling conditions for people to exercise agency and rationality, enabling youth political participation … to influence policies and programmes.” In that context, procedural incentives are important to promote young people’s participation.^[vii]

In Bhutan, clear election procedures were established by the country’s constitution, which requires members of the National Council to be at least 25 years old, and the 2008 election act, which made it compulsory for candidates to have an undergraduate degree. The latter criterion emphasised the need for parliamentarians to have subject-matter expertise to be better able to study policies and legislation.^[viii] This provision disappointed former representatives who had served in the old National Assembly between 1953 and 2007, as “they saw no place for themselves in the new parliamentary setup”.^[ix]

When a draft of the 2008 election act was adopted the previous year, only 16,000 of the country’s then 634,000 inhabitants had an undergraduate degree.^[x] This shows that the law represented an elitist approach to democracy: formal education was equated with competence, making democratic processes an arena for the qualified few – the academic elite.

In each of the three National Council elections held from 2007 to 2018, the largest group of candidates consisted of those under the age of 35. These candidates are likely to have had less than 10 years’ professional experience, as most Bhutanese are around 23–24 when they complete their first university degree. In 2007–08, 19 out of 52 candidates were aged 25–29. By contrast, in the 2023 election, the first held after the introduction of the 10-year rule, there were no candidates in this age range (figure 11.1).

Figure 11.1. Number of candidates in National Council elections by age, 2007–23

In the elections before 2023, some younger candidates were able to oust their older counterparts (figure 11.2).^[xi] As long as younger candidates met Bhutan’s high legal benchmarks, informal societal norms and expectations did not prevent young Bhutanese from running for office.

Figure 11.2. Number of elected National Council members by age, 2007–23

Empowerment versus elitism

Engagement in civic and community projects encourages political participation.^[xii] In Bhutan, democracy and civic-education programmes play an important role in socialising young people into mainstream politics. For example, Phuntsho was a member of the Youth Initiative launched in 2014 by the Bhutan Centre for Media Democracy. Modelled on youth parliaments in other countries, the initiative aimed to nurture and empower young people.^[xiii]

In 2015, the election commission established the Bhutan Children’s Parliament (BCP) to foster the country’s future parliamentarians. The BCP’s members were elected from democracy clubs established in 2012.^[xiv] However, the national parliament questioned the legitimacy of the BCP, which also suffered from the apprehension of its youth parliamentarians and criticism that Bhutan’s education system was being politicised.^[xv]

Despite these initiatives, youth participation in Bhutan’s mainstream politics, such as elections, remained low. In the first round of the 2013 National Assembly election, only 26.6% of those aged 18–30 cast their vote. Five years later, 21.7% of those between the ages of 18 and 24 turned out to vote.^[xvi] In the GYPI, Bhutan’s score for youth voter turnout was a meagre 21 out of 100, against a global average of 41.^[xvii]

The 2022 rule change therefore came at a time when youth enthusiasm in mainstream politics – in terms of voter turnout – was already low. The 10-year work experience requirement made Bhutan’s electoral laws more restrictive and turned electoral politics into the mainstay of a gerontocracy that undermined the younger generation while protecting the old.^[xviii] The pre-existing requirements of a minimum age limit of 25 and an undergraduate degree were already high benchmarks.^[xix] As early as 2019, critics had argued for the removal of the requirement of an undergraduate degree.^[xx]

Yet Bhutanese lawmakers and authorities have a deep-seated inclination towards an elitist, competence-based approach to democracy. Back in 2007, the National Assembly proposed that candidates should have at least eight to 10 years of work experience. The proposal was turned down, as a 10-year experience rule would have taken the effective minimum age to 34, since most Bhutanese complete their undergraduate studies at 23 or 24. This would have been at odds with the constitutional requirement of a lower age limit of 25.

In 2014, the National Council similarly proposed requiring its members, except for incumbents, to have 10 years’ work experience, with the aim of ensuring that members had the competence to review draft legislation.^[xxi] According to one analysis, the proposal had “heavy overtones of elitism and an air of preserving the old boys’ club”.^[xxii] Again, the National Assembly decided against introducing the requirement.^[xxiii]

Experience over aspiration

The 2022 rule made several aspiring candidates ineligible for election. Supporters of the new rule argued that professional experience would bring mature, well-educated, capable people with real-life professional experience into Bhutan’s legislature.^[xxiv] According to one former member of the National Council, intellectual competence and professional integrity come with age.^[xxv] There were concerns that the previous system had allowed well-connected candidates, who were not necessarily the most capable, to be elected.^[xxvi]

Young people were seen as lacking the competencies needed to shoulder the burdens of parliamentary office.^[xxvii] The rule change to privilege older, more mature, more capable, and more experienced candidates was supposedly geared towards maintaining democratic stability and coherent public policy, an approach best explained as an example of elitism.^[xxviii]

Young Bhutanese never lacked motivation to run for public office. One interviewee, Karma, had left a postgraduate studies opportunity to stand in the 2023 National Council election. Norbu, a former National Council member, said: “I was prepared to [stand for election again] to serve the people with more experience and maturity.” For Phuntsho, his engagement in various social activities and volunteerism awakened his political consciousness. Three interviewees – Karma, Dawa, and Phuntsho – were politically socialised and driven by their respective desires to contribute to decision-making, change political outcomes, and pursue the common good.

Yet for all four interviewees, their ambitions were quashed by the new rule. Norbu’s skills and knowledge from his previous term in office, Karma’s social capital and network, Phuntsho’s aspiration to influence political outcomes, and Dawa’s commitment to duty – all factors that encouraged political participation – were swept aside by the fact that they did not meet the professional experience requirement. The new rule inadvertently became anathema to the would-be candidates’ processes of political socialisation. The focus on professional experience solidified Bhutanese lawmakers’ long-standing assumption of a strong link between competence and age. Leadership skills and youthful dynamism were seen as mutually exclusive.

The 2022 rule change challenged parliamentary supremacy and became more powerful than the 2008 election act, as the numbers of candidates and elected members in the 2023 National Council election confirm.^[xxix] There were only two candidates under the age of 35, one of whom was elected.

The implications of the rule change on the motivations of young Bhutanese were significant. In the words of Dawa: “It felt like everything vanished overnight.” He continued: “The rule affected my enthusiasm, my energy … it was all drained out … I do not think we would have the same energy to come and contest in the elections [in the future].” Phuntsho reflected: “I could not participate, but that is it. It was not the end of everything for me.” But he went on to say: “I do not think I will be joining politics anymore.”

Norbu, however, said: “I will contest future elections with more experience and exposure.” The impact of structural constraints on young people’s political engagement is therefore not universal, as Norbu’s persistence attests. Yet of the four interviewees, three were discouraged from participating in future. Bhutan’s elitist approach to election rules, and to politics in general, looks set to have an effect on young people’s long-term commitment to public service and political office.

Conclusion

Young people have been referred to as “standby citizens”.^[xxx] Their low levels of political engagement have been attributed to unequal access to social services, a lack of political influence, and a lack of trust in political parties and politicians. The political climate and the discourse of youth engagement in Bhutan are no different from elsewhere, albeit with a unique national context.

Even before 2022, the minimum requirements for Bhutanese wanting to run for elected office – a lower age limit of 25 and an undergraduate degree – already set a high bar. Still, before the new rule was adopted requiring 10 years’ professional experience, the largest group of candidates for National Council elections consisted of those under 35 years of age, who may not necessarily have had 10 years of experience. Indeed, democracy and civic-education programmes, a sense of duty, and a motivation to serve all empowered young people to run for political office.

However, the requirement of 10 years’ work experience has made elected office a stronghold of the experienced and educated few, an outcome best explained as an elitist approach to democracy. Young people, previously keen to run for office, are left disappointed, and their motivation to take part in future elections may be affected. This trend, with its outcome of lower political participation, effectively cancels out young people’s gains from their initial political socialisation, the benefits of which would otherwise increase as democracy matures. At the same time, voter turnout among young Bhutanese continues to be lower than the global average.

Future research could build on this study by broadening the sample size to include not only the National Council but also the National Assembly. The impact of the 2022 rule on young people’s motivation and the composition of Bhutan’s two houses of parliament could be studied comparatively to gauge parliamentary dynamics, political participation, and the broader impact on democracy.

Further, a quantitative approach could generate data on correlation and causation, which would provide a better understanding of the impacts of legislative interventions such as eligibility criteria on youth participation. This would be an important lens through which to assess the expectation that democracy becomes more representative, participatory, and competent as it takes root.

Explore the Full Study

This chapter is part of a Deep Dive of Young Researchers who worked on Youth Participation for three years. This deep dive is a global collection of 12 case studies unpacking how young people are reshaping political engagement.

The Young Researchers’ Network is an initiative developed in the framework of the European Democracy Hub and EPD’s Women and Youth in Democracy WYDE Civic Engagement project, supported by the European Union.

Get to know the 12 Young Researchers

[i] Siok Sian Pek-Dorji, “Youth and Politics in an Evolving Democracy”, The Druk Journal 4, no. 1 (2018): 72–8, https://drukjournal.bt/youth-and-politics-in-an-evolving-democracy/.

[ii] “Country Profiles: Bhutan”, Global Youth Participation Index, European Partnership for Democracy, 2025, https://gypi.epd.eu/country-reports/bt.

[iii] “Population Projections Bhutan 2017-2047”, Bhutanese National Statistics Bureau, 2019, https://www.nsb.gov.bt/publications/census-report/.

[iv] According to their functions, the National Council may be considered equivalent to the upper house in a western political system and the National Assembly to the lower house. However, no reference is made to upper and lower houses in the Bhutanese context.

[v] “Rules on Elections Conduct in the Kingdom of Bhutan”, vol. 4.3.3.1, Election Commission of Bhutan, 2022, https://www.ecb.bt/Rules/conductofelections.pdf.

[vi] Lokanath Mishra, “Focus Group Discussion in Qualitative Research”, TechnoLearn: An International Journal of Educational Technology 6, no. 1 (2016): 1–5, https://doi.org/10.5958/2249-5223.2016.00001.2.

[vii] Jan Teorell, “Political Participation and Three Theories of Democracy: A Research Inventory and Agenda”, European Journal of Political Research 45, no. 5 (2006): 787–810, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00636.x.

[viii] “Bhutan National Human Development Report: Ten Years of Democracy in Bhutan”, Parliament of Bhutan and United Nations Development Programme, 2019, https://hdr.undp.org/system/files/documents/nhdr-2019ii.pdf.

[ix] Kunzang Wangdi, “Growing up with Modern Bhutan”, Cho Sid Public Policy Publications and Studies, 2024.

[x] “Bhutan (Gyelyong Tshogde) Elections in 2007”, Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2025, http://archive.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2036_07.htm.

[xi] Needrup Zangpo, “Bhutan’s National Council Election 2023: A Setback for Women”, Friedrich Naumann Foundation, 29 June 2023, https://www.freiheit.org/south-asia/bhutans-national-council-election-2023-setback-women.

[xii] Teorell, “Political Participation”.

[xiii] Dechen Rabgyal, Youth Civic Engagement: Concepts, Agents, Reflections and Empowerment (Trashigang: Sherubtse College, 2018).

[xiv] Wangdi, “Growing up”.

[xv] Pek-Dorji, “Youth and Politics”.

[xvi] Dechen Rabgyal, “Forces Shaping Bhutan’s Young Social Capital”, The Druk Journal 7, no. 1 (2021): 118–26, https://drukjournal.bt/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Forces-Shaping-Bhutans-Young-Social-Capital.pdf.

[xvii] “Bhutan”, European Partnership for Democracy.

[xviii] Dechen Rabgyal, “From Votes to Voices: Socialise Politics and Normalise Public Affairs to Address Bhutan’s ‘Democratic Dilemma’”, Dechen Rabgyal, 30 October 2022, https://www.dechenrabgyal.com/2022/10/30/from-votes-to-voices-socialise-politics-and-normalise-public-affairs-to-address-bhutans-democratic-dilemma/; Yeshey Lhaden, “10 Years Work Experience Mandatory to Contest for National Council – BBSCL”, BBSCL, 30 January 2014, https://www.bbs.bt/36769/.

[xix] Tenzing Lamsang, “Ruling and Opposition Parties Uneasy with ECB’s New Rules on Experienced Candidates and Showing Money for Pledges but 3 Other Parties Welcome It”, Bhutanese, 3 September 2022, https://thebhutanese.bt/ruling-and-opposition-parties-uneasy-with-ecbs-new-rules-on-experienced-candidates-and-showing-money-for-pledges-but-3-other-parties-welcome-it/.

[xx] “Bhutan”, Parliament of Bhutan.

[xxi] Lhaden, “10 Years”; “Proceedings and Resolutions of the Twelfth Session”, National Council of Bhutan, 2014.

[xxii] “House of Review Needs to Review Its Experience Criteria”, Bhutanese, 15 February 2014, https://thebhutanese.bt/house-of-review-needs-to-review-its-experience-criteria/.

[xxiii] “Proceedings and Resolutions of the National Assembly of Bhutan: Second Parliament of Bhutan, Fourth Session”, National Assembly of Bhutan, 2014; “Proceedings and Resolutions of the Thirteenth Session”, National Council of Bhutan, 2014.

[xxiv] Zangpo, “Bhutan’s National Council Election 2023”; Lamsang, “Ruling and Opposition Parties”.

[xxv] Pema Choki, “The Increasingly Important Role of the National Council over the Last 15 Years”, Bhutanese, 2023, https://thebhutanese.bt/the-increasingly-important-role-of-the-national-council-over-the-last-15-years/.

[xxvi] Nidup Lhamo, “Seminar Participants Question ECB on New Rules”, Business Bhutan, 24 October 2022, https://businessbhutan.bt/seminar-participants-question-ecb-on-new-rules/.

[xxvii] Jack L. Walker, “A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy”, American Political Science Review 60, no. 2 (1966): 285–95, https://doi.org/10.2307/1953356.

[xxviii] Fredrik Engelstad, “Democratic Elitism – Conflict and Consensus”, Comparative Sociology 8, no. 3 (2009): 383–401, https://doi.org/10.1163/156913309×447585; Robert A. Dahl, “Further Reflections on ‘the Elitist Theory of Democracy’”, American Political Science Review 60, no. 2 (1966), 296–305, https://doi.org/10.2307/1953357.

[xxix] Kinley Wangchuk, From Armed Parliamentarians to Peaceful Debates: Principles and Practices of Bhutan’s Democracy (Thimphu: Kinley Wangchuk, 2024).

[xxx] Erik Amnå and Joakim Ekman, “Standby Citizens: Diverse Faces of Political Passivity”, European Political Science Review 6, no. 2 (2014): 261–81, https://doi.org/10.1017/s175577391300009x.

The post Chapter 11 by Dechen Rabgyal first appeared on Youth Democracy Cohort.

Youth Political Participation in Mozambique’s Disconnected Democracy

In recent years, social media have become an integral part of young people’s daily lives. Giving users the ability to connect with others and access information quickly and easily, social media have become a powerful tool for political expression and engagement.[i] As the largest generation in history, today’s young people increasingly use social media to participate in political discourse, share their opinions, and mobilise others to take action.[ii] However, the impacts of social media on youth political participation are not entirely clear, and there is still much debate about whether social media are a force for good or bad in the political sphere.[iii]

On the one hand, social media have enabled young people to take part in political discussions and movements in ways that were previously impossible.[iv] Social media have made it easier for young people to organise and take part in protests, rallies, and other forms of activism.[v] On the other hand, there are concerns about the effects of social media, such as the potential to create echo chambers, in which young people interact only with those who share their views.[vi] Social media can also be used to spread misinformation and propaganda, which can undermine the quality of political discourse and democratic processes.[vii]

Taking Mozambique as a case study, this research investigates the impact of social media on the political participation of young people in the country, including their levels of engagement in political discussions, their attitudes towards political issues, and their participation in campaigns and social movements.[viii] Specifically, the chapter analyses the potential benefits and drawbacks of social media for youth political participation in Mozambique’s 2024 general elections.

Dércio Tsandzana is a Mozambican political scientist whose research explores youth political participation and how digital platforms are reshaping political engagement.

Get to know Dercio

Methodology

The methodology for this research is based on virtual ethnography – or, more precisely, netnography – which is ideal for researching online communities, cultures, and behaviours.[ix] Without the need for direct contact with participants, netnography enables the collection and interpretation of existing digital data. This study concentrated on online discussions and interactions related to Mozambique’s 2024 general elections, paying special attention to the growing political activism linked to the hashtag #PovoNoPoder (People in Power). This digital movement offered a distinct perspective for examining how young people express their political demands, grievances, and activities online.

The study observed a variety of social media platforms, including Facebook, X (previously Twitter), public WhatsApp groups, and TikTok. Over six months from October 2024 to March 2025, observations were made of online conversations, blogs, memes, videos, and comment threads. Relevant posts were identified using the platforms’ own search engines, drawing on hashtags such as #PovoNoPoder, #Moçambique (Mozambique), and #Eleições (Elections). As a researcher and digital media user from Mozambique, this author was able to analyse content in its original linguistic and cultural setting while being mindful of the dangers of personal bias.

This study was influenced by ethical considerations. Although the data was derived from publicly accessible digital content, anonymity and privacy were meticulously maintained. Quotes and posts were gathered exclusively from open forums; closed or private conversations were not included. The visible online political activity is likely to have been skewed towards more connected youth from the urban areas of Maputo and Matola, because internet access is still unequal in Mozambique, especially outside towns and cities.[x]

The study was also limited by the transient nature of digital content, which makes verification and archiving difficult. Posts, accounts, and entire narratives can be erased over time. Because there was no direct connection with the content’s authors, interpretation depends largely on contextual reading, which is perceptive but may miss offline context. This research was also subject to the possible presence of bot accounts and the constraints of limited internet connectivity in Mozambique. These factors may have influenced patterns of online engagement and, consequently, the conclusions drawn from the study.

Mozambique’s internet landscape

The internet has significantly transformed the way people communicate and participate in politics globally. According to data-tracking website DataReportal, in early 2025 there were 17.7 million active mobile phone connections in Mozambique, equating to 50.4% of the country’s total population (figure 1.1).[xi]

Some of these connections might not offer internet access, while others might only have phone and text-messaging services. Still, at the start of 2025, Mozambique’s internet penetration rate was 19.8%, with 6.96 million people using the web. Mozambique had 3.7 million social media user identities, representing 10.5% of the country’s population. Of these users, 58.7% were male and 41.3% were female.

Data from Meta’s advertising resources indicate that Facebook is the most popular social media platform in Mozambique. Facebook’s potential ad reach in the country grew by 500,000 (15.6%) between January 2024 and January 2025, according to Meta’s data. In the three months between October 2024 and January 2025, the number of Mozambicans whom marketers could contact via Facebook advertising rose by 400,000, or 12.1%.[xii]

Barriers to youth political participation

Making up more than 60% of Mozambique’s population, people under 25 are undoubtedly a large constituency, yet historically they have had low levels of formal political participation.[xiii] Many young Mozambicans express a sense of disengagement from electoral politics, citing a lack of faith in political parties, scarce economic opportunities, and an absence of meaningful representation. However, young people have embraced new forms of participation, especially online.[xiv] Political content, memes, satire, and unplanned conversations have exploded on platforms including Facebook, X, and TikTok.

On the European Partnership for Democracy’s Global Youth Participation Index, Mozambique scored 45 out of 100, reflecting a country with immense demographic potential but persistent structural barriers to youth participation.[xv] Young people are a powerful force for political and economic change, yet this potential remains largely untapped. On the index’s political affairs dimension, Mozambique scored 41 out of 100, reflecting young people’s low representation in the country’s parliament, an absence of formal advisory mechanisms, and a lack of youth quotas.

Young people’s involvement in Mozambique’s elections is similarly constrained. On the index’s elections dimension, the country scored 43 out of 100, revealing logistical difficulties, distrust in electoral institutions, and widespread voter apathy. While a national youth policy exists and efforts have been made to strengthen youth inclusion frameworks, the implementation of these measures has been slow. Political parties offer few meaningful entry points for young leaders, and the provision of civic education is inconsistent across the country. Youth political engagement became both a crucial problem and a significant uncertainty in Mozambique’s general elections held on 9 October 2024.

Mozambique’s 2024 general elections

The conduct of the 2024 elections was widely criticised. The late opening of polling stations, irregularities in voter lists, and instances of ballot stuffing in strategic districts were among the numerous problems recorded during the registration and voting stages of the election process.[xvi] International observers and local civil society organisations like Sala da Paz documented and condemned multiple cases of malpractice.

The official results showed that the ruling FRELIMO party retained a majority in parliament, although the election procedure was widely viewed as defective and opaque. This outcome reinforced many young Mozambicans’ feelings of political futility, as their online involvement did not translate into institutional change.[xvii]

The gap between official institutions and the lived realities of the population, especially young people, has become a more prominent topic of discussion since the elections. Although government officials have recognised the significance of youth inclusion, there are still few real mechanisms for engagement. As a result, digital platforms have evolved into venues for identity creation, resistance, and informal political education as well as expression.[xviii]

The 2024 elections therefore provide a critical lens through which to view Mozambique’s changing political landscape, in which young people are establishing alternative forms of engagement, often with humour, defiance, and inventiveness, and traditional channels are increasingly mistrusted.

Case study: #PovoNoPoder

The grassroots slogan-turned-movement #PovoNoPoder rose to prominence in Mozambique’s online public domain ahead of the 2024 elections. #PovoNoPoder is best understood as a symbolic and dispersed form of digital resistance, rather than a formal civil society campaign or an organised political organisation. It acted as a rallying cry for the populace, especially the young, who were fed up with the nation’s established political class, an unreliable electoral system, and institutions’ inability to address the public’s issues. Instead of using traditional modes of protest, the hashtag accompanied humour, memes, slogans, and impromptu commentary to convey a desire for radical political change.

The main players behind #PovoNoPoder were young people with digital connections, many of whom live in metropolitan and peri-urban areas like Maputo, Beira, and Nampula, although the movement lacked official leaders. Among the main actors were university students, rappers, digital artists, meme curators, amateur critics, and anonymous netizens. Crucially, the movement also struck a chord with members of the Mozambican diaspora, who amplified criticism and expressed their solidarity using the hashtag. It was challenging for the government to repress or co-opt #PovoNoPoder, since it functioned in a fluid, decentralised manner, in contrast to typical political groups.

No official political-party plan or civic campaign served as the inspiration for #PovoNoPoder. Rather, it developed organically in mid-2024 on sites like Facebook, WhatsApp, TikTok, and X as online grievances about pre-election anomalies started to flare up. Memes and short videos began to use the phrase while ridiculing the political establishment, particularly FRELIMO’s power and the alleged appropriation of electoral institutions.

The emergence of #PovoNoPoder, which reached its zenith around polling day on 9 October, accompanied a broad public outcry against election irregularities, such as problems with voter registration, claims of intimidation, and erratic correspondence from electoral authorities. Long-standing complaints, like elite impunity, urban inequality, and youth unemployment, added to these annoyances, fostering an environment that was conducive to a digital rupture. Particularly after photos and videos of alleged ballot fraud and disturbances at polling stations went viral, the hashtag’s popularity skyrocketed. The hashtag evolved into a vehicle for political storytelling and internet mobilisation, offering immediate criticism and emotional support at a turbulent moment.

Social media as a political forum

Online discontent continued after the elections. Between October 2024 and March 2025, numerous posts were published on X with the hashtag #PovoNoPoder. Most users, primarily young people, used the hashtag to express their frustration with the ruling party.

In one example, a video clip shows police using tear gas and fighting with teenage protesters on the street.[xix] The excerpt reveals how internet platforms have evolved into venues for recording and challenging state violence in Mozambique. The post highlights the harsh methods used to quell dissent, especially among young people who want to express themselves politically outside established channels. The post serves as both evidence and testimony, turning regular social media use into a political act of resistance and witness.

This example shows how digital media can act as a virtual forum in which young people can reveal abuses and spark public anger. Such videos inspire, motivate, and emotionally energise viewers in addition to providing information. In this way, digital engagement becomes embodied in real feelings of dread, danger, and confrontation, rather than being restricted to hashtags or abstract criticism. Outrage, sadness, and solidarity are key components of the way young people interact with politics in constricted and monitored political environments. In short, social media enable a new kind of affective political participation.

In other posts on X, users, again mainly young people, shared messages with revolutionary undertones, expressing a belief that the time for change had arrived. One such post (translated from Portuguese) read as follows:

This is the best moment to be Mozambican … I am EXTREMELY PROUD of the UNITY we are showing as a people. We are the most united 20% in all of history.
LET’S SAVE MOZAMBIQUE
THE REVOLUTION HAS ALREADY ARRIVED … !!
#SaveMozambique #ThisCountryIsOurs #7November #POVONOPODER[xx]

This post demonstrates the affective and symbolic aspect of young people’s digital political participation in Mozambique. Social media sites like X are used for more than just criticism or satire; they are also employed to create shared feelings, validate identities, and envisage different political futures. The message above uses urgency and an emotionally charged vernacular, rather than formal political language or institutional speech, to evoke a sense of resistance and affiliation. It also illustrates how #PovoNoPoder serves as a discursive forum in which demands for civic unity, national redemption, and dignity come together.

Meanwhile on Facebook, the hashtag #PovoNoPoder was widely shared by young people as a form of support for presidential candidate Venâncio Mondlane, who appropriated the youth protest movement to gain sympathisers and build a political challenge to FRELIMO. Several pages were created with the aim of amplifying the voice of #PovoNoPoder, always in connection with the 2024 elections. This approach was in contrast to the use of the hashtag on X, where the movement appeared less directly tied to the electoral process.

In one Facebook post, for example, a video shows young people protesting in the streets of Maputo and driving the police away from a meeting point.[xxi] The police, who are typically the aggressors, are shown as being pushed back by the very young people they are trying to suppress. In the post, the video is accompanied by Mondlane’s name and the hashtag #PovoNoPoder.

The way that digital platforms are used to combine informal activism with official political processes is one example of how youth political participation and social media in Mozambique are changing. Facebook has become a platform on which symbolic opposition is more overtly translated into electoral engagement, in contrast to X, where the hashtag #PovoNoPoder often functioned as a more general symbol of resistance and collective frustration. In another post on Facebook, a call to action urges young people to act for change and stop the violence.[xxii] Much of the youth-led digital mobilisation during Mozambique’s 2024 elections was marked by emotion and urgency for change.

It is worth noting that the durability of young Mozambicans’ digital political involvement is also impacted by the cyclical nature of elections and the volatility of online attention. Digital movements often pick up steam during political crises or election contests, but once the current event is over, this intensity usually fades.

This transience raises fundamental questions about whether online energy is being channelled into longer-term forms of civic participation, institution building, or community organising. Young activists often find it difficult to sustain their projects because of inadequate civic infrastructure, scarce resources, and a lack of supportive institutional processes. Consequently, postelection periods are marked by declines in digital engagement, highlighting the challenges of converting episodic online mobilisation into sustained political influence within Mozambique’s evolving democratic landscape.

Conclusion

More than just a political struggle, Mozambique’s 2024 general elections revealed how youth political participation in the digital age is changing and often conflictual. Social media platforms have emerged as crucial forums for the expression of dissatisfaction, the formation of identities, and alternative conceptions of power, even though many young people have lost faith in traditional politics.[xxiii] Movements like #PovoNoPoder show that young people in Mozambique are not passive; rather, they are actively involved, albeit often outside established political systems. Their involvement is multifaceted, ranging from confrontational to symbolic to increasingly digital. But there are conflicts in these interactions, too.

Youth engagement runs the risk of losing its transformative and moral force when it becomes enmeshed with party-political objectives or reflects the violence it aims to oppose. These inconsistencies highlight Mozambique’s larger fight to democratise public space, both real and virtual, as well as institutions. In Mozambique, youth political engagement follows nonlinear and ill-defined paths. These are full of opportunity, innovation, and resistance, but they are also shaped by history and limited by systemic injustices.

The challenge is not to ask whether young Mozambicans are political but to acknowledge and support the various complicated and sometimes unsettling ways in which they are already changing the political landscape – post by post, hashtag by hashtag, and, when necessary, voice by voice in the streets.

Explore the Full Study

This chapter is part of a Deep Dive of Young Researchers who worked on Youth Participation for three years. This deep dive is a global collection of 12 case studies unpacking how young people are reshaping political engagement.

The Young Researchers’ Network is an initiative developed in the framework of the European Democracy Hub and EPD’s Women and Youth in Democracy WYDE Civic Engagement project, supported by the European Union.

Get to know the 12 Young Researchers

[i] Manuel Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age (London: Polity, 2012).

[ii] Brian Loader et al., “The networked young citizen: social media, political participation and civic engagement”, Information, Communication & Society 17, no. 2 (2014): 143–50.

[iii] James Sloam and Matt Henn, Youthquake 2017: The Rise of Young Cosmopolitans in Britain (London: Palgrave, 2019).

[iv] Antonio Cortés-Ramos et al., “Activism and Social Media: Youth Participation and Communication”, Sustainability 13, no. 18 (2021): 10485.

[v] Lance Bennett and Alexandra Segerberg, “The logic of connective action: Digital media and the personalization of contentious politics”, Information, Communication & Society 15, no. 5 (2012): 739–68.

[vi] Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet is Hiding from You (Penguin UK, 2011).

[vii] Samuel Woolley and Philip Howard, Computational Propaganda: Political Parties, Politicians, and Political Manipulation on Social Media (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

[viii] Dércio Tsandzana, “Reporting on Everyday Life: Practices and Experiences of Citizen Journalism in Mozambique”, in New Journalism Ecologies in East and Southern Africa. Palgrave Studies in Journalism and the Global South, edited by Trust Matsilele, Shepherd Mpofu, and Dumisani Moyo (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023).

[ix] Robert Kozinets, Netnography: Redefined (London: Sage Publications, 2016).

[x] Tsandzana, “Reporting”.

[xi] Simon Kemp, “Digital 2025: Mozambique”, DataReportal, 3 March 2025, https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2025-mozambique.

[xii] Kemp, “Digital 2025”.

[xiii] “Mozambique Data”, World Bank, 2025, https://data.worldbank.org/country/mozambique.

[xiv] Dércio Tsandzana, “Redes Sociais da Internet como ‘Tubo de Escape’ Juvenil no Espaço Político-Urbano em Moçambique” [Internet Social Networks as a Youth “Escape Tube” in the Political-Urban Space in Mozambique], Cadernos de Estudos Africanos 40, no. 2 (2020): 167–89.

[xv] “Explore Youth Participation in Mozambique”, Global Youth Participation Index, European Partnership for Democracy, 2025, https://gypi.epd.eu/country-reports/mz.

[xvi] Zenaida Machado, “Mozambique’s Ruling Party Wins Elections Amid Nationwide Protests”, Human Rights Watch, 2024, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/10/24/mozambiques-ruling-party-wins-elections-amid-nationwide-protests.

[xvii] Domingos Getimane et al., “Impact of news consumption on social media during the 2024 electoral campaign in Mozambique”, Insight – News Media 7, no. 1 (2024): 668.

[xviii] “Mozambique: Post-Election Internet Restrictions Hinder Rights”, Human Rights Watch, 2024, https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/11/06/mozambique-post-election-internet-restrictions-hinder-rights.

[xix] Moz Informa, “!!! Na Av. Eduardo Mondlane” [!!! On Eduardo Mondlane Avenue], X, 22 November 2024, accessed 30 November 2025, https://x.com/mozinforma/status/1859925353088864538?s=20.

[xx] O Tigre Branco, “Esse é o melhor momento para ser um Moçambicano” [This is the best moment to be Mozambican], X, 5 November 2024, accessed 30 November 2025, https://x.com/Cheque_Senpai/status/1853872286970900622.

[xxi] Kelven Mídia, “A população contra a Polícia da República de Moçambique” [The population against the police of the Republic of Mozambique], Facebook, 24 October 2024, accessed 30 November 2025, https://www.facebook.com/kelvenmidia/videos/855214910098840/.

[xxii] DW Africa, “Artistas em protesto contra violência eleitoral em Moçambique” [Artists protest against electoral violence in Mozambique], Facebook, 14 December 2024, accessed 4 February 2026, https://www.facebook.com/dw.portugues/videos/artistas-em-protesto-contra-viol%C3%AAncia-eleitoral-em-mo%C3%A7ambique/1615312362693107/.

[xxiii] Dércio Tsandzana, “Juventude urbana e redes sociais em Moçambique: a participação política dos ‘conectados desamparados’” [Urban youth and social networks in Mozambique: The political participation of the “connected but helpless”], Sociedade e Comunicação 34, no. 2 (2018): 235–50.

The post Chapter 1. by Dércio Tsandzana first appeared on Youth Democracy Cohort.

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Maïmouna Ba is a passionate humanitarian activist dedicated to transforming pain and hardship into strength and dignity for forcibly displaced women and children, as well as those from poor families in Burkina Faso and Africa. As a fervent defender of human rights, she has helped many women regain their financial independence, offering them a chance to rebuild their lives with dignity and pride.

Her impact goes far beyond numbers. Every woman she helps represents a victory over adversity, and every child she brings back to school is a promise of a better future. Her unwavering commitment and profound humanity earned her the prestigious UNHCR Nansen Refugee Award in 2024 and the Young Activists Summit Award in 2023.

In a world often marked by indifference, Maïmouna BA, through the Maman Sahélienne Foundation, strives to be a powerful reminder of what compassion and action can achieve. She embodies the idea that even in the darkest of times, there is a glimmer of hope and the possibility of change and hope.

The post Maimouna Ba first appeared on Youth Democracy Cohort.

The project ‘Advocacy for an inclusive and safe digital space for young people in Chad’ aims to protect and empower young people in the face of online risks (cyberviolence, misinformation, exploitation). It promotes equitable access to the internet, digital education and stronger public policies to ensure a cyberspace that is safe, inclusive and conducive to the development of young people in Chad.

Activities

• Establishment of a Digital Policy Advocacy Committee comprising young people, women, CSOs and government representatives
• To monitor, analyse and promote improvements in public policy relating to digital issues, particularly in the areas of digital rights, data protection, internet governance and digital inclusion.
• Production of position papers, recommendations, monitoring reports and awareness-raising initiatives aimed at national decision-makers.

Expected results

An operational, representative cross-party committee with expertise in governance and digital policy issues.

Regular reports on the monitoring and analysis of digital policies, produced and distributed to decision-makers and partners.

Greater participation by young people and women in national processes relating to digital governance and advocacy.

Better coordination between civil society, public institutions and sectors involved in the digital sphere.

Gradual improvement in the quality, transparency and inclusiveness of national digital policies, thanks to the committee’s recommendations

About House of Africa

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House of Africa advocates for the development of ICT in Africa and contributes to the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (SDGs) and the African Union’s Agenda 2063. House of Africa provides an open and collaborative space to support the empowerment of young people, children and women in Africa.

The post House of Africa first appeared on Youth Democracy Cohort.

The Digitalise Youth – Young Actors in Digital Democracy project is an advocacy initiative aimed at strengthening young people’s democratic participation by defending their digital rights. It seeks to promote an open, safe and inclusive digital space whilst engaging young people in a structured dialogue with public authorities.

Activities

• Building young people’s capacity in digital rights
• Development of a youth advocacy document
• Multi-stakeholder dialogues with national authorities
• Digital advocacy campaign

Expected results

At least 100 young people trained, with teaching materials and a simplified guide to digital rights.

An advocacy document endorsed by young people and distributed to young people and national decision-makers.

Establishing a framework for constructive dialogue that enables concrete recommendations to be made and encourages the authorities to commit to greater youth participation in decision-making.

A campaign reaching at least 10,000 people online.

About FESTIC

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Founded in Dakar in 2018, FESTIC is a Senegalese non-profit women’s organisation working to empower women through digital transformation, advocacy for their meaningful representation in decision-making bodies, networking, the promotion of women and girls in ICT, gender equality, human rights and solidarity, whilst maintaining complete political independence.

The post FESTIC – Association of Senegalese Women in ICT first appeared on Youth Democracy Cohort.

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Mohamud Elmi is a Garowe-based journalist and media professional with a strong focus on investigative and public interest reporting. His work centers on social issues, youth development, media ethics, and community resilience in Puntland. Through in-depth storytelling and research-driven reporting, he aims to amplify underrepresented voices and contribute to informed public discourse. Mohamud is committed to professional standards, accuracy, and impactful communication that supports social awareness and positive change.

How Garowe Youth Can Fight Misinformation

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